An analytical study of perception by Rogers, Anna Sophie

»
AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF PERCEPTION
ANNA SOPHIE ROGERS
A. B. University of Illinois, 1911
A. M. University of Illinois, 1914
THESIS
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN PSYCHOLOGY
IN
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
1917

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
May 15th..i9i 7
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPER-
VISION BY A^M.....?P.?EI.?......?. <?.^.?.?.? _
ENTITLED AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF PERCEPTION ;
BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF .D.Q.C.T.QR....QE....PHI10.3.Q.PHY..
In Cfcafge of Thesis
'MZ@&^,„
.Head of Department
Recommendation concurred in :*
Committee
on
Final Examination*
*Required for doctor's degree but not for master's.
o
i
b i 10

TABLE 01 COUTEIfTS
"Page
I. Introduction 1
A. Che meaning of the terra 'perception' 2
B. Perception in modern psychology 11
II. Experimental Investigations 37
A. An analysis of simole perceptions 37
3. The elaboration of perceotual meaning 48
G. Relation of attention to perception 57
D. A comparison of the primary and the
accessory processes in perception 65
Summary and Conclusions 73
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/analyticalstudyoOOroge
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
The reflective study of perception has had a long and
involved history, -- a history which extends, as we may supoose,
far beyond the centuries of written record. For the obvious
dependence of existence uoon knowledge gained by the senses
must have suggested one of tne very earliest of all the human
problems concerned with mind. The implication of mind, however,
in the direct apprehension of present objects has not by any
means restricted the stud:/ of nerception to the psychologist.
The philosopher, the logician, the anatomist, the physiologist,
and the general student of life, as well as the psychologist,
have derived problems from, and erected theories upon, the facts
of perception. These facts have had their bearing upon the
cnaracter, the trustworthiness, and the limitations of Knowledge
upon the substance of reality and the nature of trutn, uoon the
construction and the operations of tne senses, and uoon the
mutual relations of the organism and its surroundings.
Our own study is to be limited to the psychological
aspects of oerceotion. All of tne other aspects we shall leave
out of account. And within psychology itself the field of per-
ception is so broad and the problems so diverse that we shall be
obliged to orooose still further restrictions upon the range of
our imuiry. It is nrincioally of the analysis of the percep-
tion that we shall treat. We have chosen this r>art of the whole
oroblem both because analysis has been neglected, even in
experimental treatises, and because a description in analytic
terms seems to us to be fundamental to any scientific treatment

-2-
of mind.
In the following investigation, we shall first
approach our subject from the historical side, to distinguish
the old from the new and to set our own problems and methods in
a just and significant relation to others.
A . The meaning of the term 'perception 1'.
1. Historical summary.
until recent times two widely divergent views of
perception were current in the history of psycnology; two views
which snow a general correspondence to the ancient dualism of
activity and passivity. As aoolied to mental facts at large,
tne one side of the dualism conceives of mind as an agent or
power, actively manifesting itself in the world; the other side
conceives of it either as a product or a reflection of nature,
but without dynamic or creative functions. As regards "oerceo-
tion, the one view presents a faculty, by which the mind or the
soul nuts forth its oower in the apprehension of surrounding
objects; the other view presents a kind of knowledge, mediated
by the senses and constructed according to a principle of
association or to some law of bodily functions. The two views
are to be traced tnrough the long history of reflective thought,
the emphasis placed now upon tne one side and now uoon the other
according to trie temper of the philosophical, theological, and
scientific theories of the time.
The first way of treating the problems of perception
has been common since the time of Plato; the second attained
its greatest prominence in the eighteenth century through the
development of the doctrine of "sensationalism".
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Plato and Aristotle are among the earliest of
western philosophers to consider perceotion as a iaculty whence
tne mind or soul derived its knowledge of the ohysical world.
The outside world has somehow to be made known to man and the
means of knowledge resolved itself into a passage of impress-
ions through the senses. The impressions once received were
organized by the soul (Plato J or the common sense (Aristotle).
The Platonic and Aristolelian view of perception was
destined to exert a strong influence for many centuries.
Restatements of the doctrine are to he found in Descartes, in
Locke, and in Leibniz. In the system of Descartes, perceotion
is called a ''function" , but "function" is only the older
"faculty" in disguise. And as with Plato, so with Descartes
the soul is the unifying agent for the various imoressions of
4
sense. Leibniz likewise adheres to an interpretation of tne
soul in terms oi faculties. The entire universe is composed of
dynamic monads, which are ordered from the lowest to the high-
est according to their ability to perceive. In the human being,
the monad or soul becomes the bond of union. This conception
of an unification of all activities by the single monad is
strongly reminiscent of Plato and Aristotle. Perception is con-
ceived as one of tne activities of the monad. Tne individual
perceptions vary as to clearness, some being obscure and others
1. Plato, Theaet etus (Ed. I. Burnet, Oxford ed. ) , Sec. 151-loE;
Republic (Ed. Stallbaum)
.
V, xxi, VII, vii.
2. Aristotle, De anima (Ed. F. A. Trendelenburg), II,iii-xii,
III, i-ii.
3. Descartes, R. , The passions (Ed. 0. Adam and a . Tannery),
Sec. xvii, xix-xxxv.
4. Leibniz, ". J., Monadology
,
1714, Sec. 14, 19, 21.
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clear. If a monad cannot distinguish between two objects
or between itself and tne objects, then the perception is
obscure. If, on tne other nana, the monad distinguishes
between objects, and apprehends itself as different from ob-
jects, then it has the oower of clear perception and is regard-
ed as a soul. Lifee Descartes and Leibniz, Locke -regards per-
ception as an activity or power. He maintains that it is the
primary faculty for receiving knowledge about the physical
world. Wot every impression upon the sense organ, however,
gives rise to a perception, whether or not it does deoends
uoon the frequency of its occurrence, and also upon the mind's
nreoccupat ion with other ideas. For Locke, however, nerceo-
tion is more than a faculty or r>ower; it is the material of
knowledge. Through the medium of sensations the organism per-
ceives objects as oossessing the primary qualities of extension
motion, number, and figure, and tne secondary qualities of
sound, color, and the like.
By all these writers, then, oerceotion has been re-
garded as a capacity, power, or faculty of mind, with the
qualification that in LocKe, although defined as a faculty, it
is also regarded as a kind of knowledge originating in
"sensation". After Locke the notion th^t oerceotion results
from the combination of sense imoressions received elaborate
exposition at the hands of the "associat ionists" . Hume ex-
pressed the doctrine when he sr.id concerning oorcent ions of
snace and of time that "there is another very decisive argu-
5. Locke, J., Essa- concerning human understanding , London, 1823,
Bk.I; Bk. II, Chap. 9.
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ment , which establishes the oresent doctrine concerning our
ideas of soace and time, and is founded only on that simple
principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of -^arts which
are indivisible. "
7
Much later. Bain includes muscular feelings as well as
sensory impressions in the materials of oerceotion. Moreover,
"oerception is, according to Bain, a more highly intellectual
process than sensation. The criterion which determines whether
a process is intellectual or sensory is discrimination, or the
feeling of a difference. The fundamental fact of -oerception,
namely that it is the result of association, signifies that
several constituents are present and are accompanied by a feel-
ing of difference between the successive or coexisting im-
pressions. Bain anticipates James in this distinction between
oerception and sensation, making the difference one of kind
and degree of knowledge. James maintains that perceptions
and sensations resemble eacn other, but are not identical.
Perception differs from sensation in that it implies "con-
sciousness of farther facts associated with the object of sen-
sation. " 8
The principle of assoc iat ionisra was adooted by the
French psychologists, Condillac and Sonnet. Condillac worked
out an elaborate system of sensationalism. Svery capacity of
6. Hume, D.
, A. treatise of human nature, 1748, II, iii.
7. Bain, A., The senses and the intellect
,
II. Y.
, 1374, 364;
The emotions and the will , W. Y.
,
1876, 549.
8. James, Tv., The principles of osycholo.^y
, N. Y.
,
1890, II, 77,
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the soul is derived from sensations, between which are established
9
associative connections. He anticipates Herbart's mechanics of
ideas in assuming that some impressions and presentations are
favored by desire and attention, while others are kept in the
background. Like Cond iliac, Bonnet derived all mental life from
sense impressions, but instead of resulting from the association
of sensations, everything was to be interpreted in terms of
nervous mechanisms. The description of mind becomes a "nerve-
fibre psychology".^ Jerceotion originates from the simultaneous
and successive excitations, which give rise to sympathetic move-
ment in connecter or contiguous libers.
In Grerman psychology of the eighteenth century, accounts
of percept ion w ere given both in terms of faculty, as expounded
by the pnilosopher Christian 7/olff, and in terms of the sensation-
11
alism of England and franco. Later, in Herbart, perception,
like all other mental phenomena, was reducea to the single,
primary act of presentation f Vorst ellen ) . It was the result of
fusions and complications. Herbart's emphasis uoon the fluid and
the dynamic aspects of mind has exerted a strong influence in the
subsequent scientific period. But it is or inci pally V.undt's in-
sistence upon mental analysis in terms of process that has given
us the doctrine of perception as a typical mental formation whose
members are the simple processes of sensation and feeling.
9. Dessoir,M., Abrisg einer Jeschichte der 'Jsycholo gie
,
Heidelberg
1911, 114.
10. Klemm, 0., 'J-eschichte der Psycholo^ie
,
Leipzig, 1911, 98.
11. Herbart, J. i'. , iiehrbuch zur Psychologie
,
1834, Sec. 55-56.
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2. Current uses.
As in earlier times so also during the scientific period
the word 'p erceot ion 1 has been out to two unlike uses, -- uses
which are similar to, but not identical with, the older daalism.
j'irst, it is treated as one of the major functions of the mind,
after the pattern of the active powers or "faculties", and second-
ly, it is more passively regarded as a composite of individual
processes. Functionally treated, perception becomes a performance
12
an accomplishment, or the discharge of a service; " more passive-
ly and descriptively regarded, it is an organic whole, analyzable
into component parts. On the side of function, the perceptual
performance may be purely mental, as knowledge of environment,
cognition of the world, or it may be a psychophysical function
which the whole organism expresses in overt or inhibited action.
The first is the cognitive, the second the biological function of
percept ion.
Among the writers interpreting perception as a composite
of elementary processes, are to be found ".Vundt
,
litohener, Angell,
James, Binet. Perception thus considered is organized; i . e
.
.
its constituents are arranged in definite configurations and
patterns. The exact nature of these constituents varies from
author to author, but there is a general agreement as regards
sensational and imaginal processes, both of which vary from in-
dividual to individual and from perception to perception. LT ot
12. Ruckmich, 0. \. , The uses of the term function in English
textbooks of psychology, Amsr. J. of Psychol ., 1913, xxiv, 99;
Dallenbach, K. k. , The history and derivation of the word 1 func-
tion 1 as a systematic term in psychology, ibid. , 1915, xxvi , 4 73.

only do images arise with sensations to form perceptions, but
13
affections are, according to 7/undt , also regarded as constant,
component parts. This affective component is less re.-ardeo in
perception by kitchener, An^ell, and James. A "oure" Dercer>tion
would be composed of sensations alcne, but this seldom exists.
There are usually imaginal accompaniment s , the kind deoending
both unon individual constitution and u^on the previous setting
of similar experiences.
Again, there are other writers who propose another
kind of constituent for the perceotual comolex, a formal or
'funded' quality. 1 Over and above the sensational and imaginal
processes, those writers profess to find something which deter-
mines the perceptual complex and which is 'subjectively' added.
The ohief exponents of this theory have belonged to the Austrian
school. Among them are iShrenfels, Meinong, Cornelius, and "'ita-
sek. The real value of their contention lies, not in the discov-
ery of new and unique members or factors in the oerceotual com-
plex, but upon the fact -- overlooked by traditional sensational-
ism -- that the perception has characteristics, properties, and
functions which distinguish it and which disappear when the com-
plex undergoes analysis.
Where perception is thus regarded nrocess-wise as a
group of integrate:! and organized members, it is obvious that its
cognitive asoect, - its meaning, - has senarately to be consider-
ed. The relation of process to meaning in perception has been
13 . Wundt , V. .
,
^randzttge - or ohys iologischen psychologie
,
L e i e z i
g
1911, III feTh ed . }, 296.
14. 3entley, M. , The psychology of mental arrangement, Amer. -J. of
Psychol
.
,
1902, xiii
,
269.'
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variously conceived. Some writers a -Tree in regarding images as
the most important factor for giving ourport to the complex.
According to the V/undtian doctrine of 'context', as expounded by
15
Titchener, it is the background which may be either imafrinal
or sensational, which nlves si gnificance to the Perception.
TThen regarded functionally, perception v/ears a different
aspect and it provokes a different kind of scientific enquiry.
Let tts consider it first as a mental function and afterward as a
psychophysical function. The first kind finds an exponent in
16
Stout, who describes perception as "essentially cognition". He
means that the mind acquires knowledge of objects by means of a
cognitive performance. Stout nas been influenced by James: but
James was interested in the biological or psychophysical as well
17
as in tne cognitive functions of perception, according to ?;hich
the response of the organism or the motor discharge forms part of
the oerception as essential as the afferent impulse. Such a view
is sustained, e
. g, , by Dewey, who, in opposition to Stout, de-
fines perception as primarily a fact of action, not one of cogni-
18
tion. The perceived objects are arranged about our bodies as
centers and our field of perception increases and varies with the
growth and needs of the organism. ITrom action to adjustment is a
short steo, and it has become common for writers whose main inter
est lias on the biological side to affirm that the adaptation of
the organism to its surroundings is the primary function of oer-
15. litchener
,
B.B.. A textbook of Psychology , N. Y. ,1915, 367. 3f
Angell, J. R.
,
Psychology
,
LI. Y.
,
1908, 156.
16. Stout, Jr., A IJanual of Psychology , N . Y .
,
1899, 241.
17. James, V.., Tae principles of psychology
,
1890, II,chae. xix.
18. Dewey, J., Perception and organic action, J. of ^hilos .
,
Psycnol.
,
Etc
., 1912, ix, 645.
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ceot ion.
Perception finds a place as a mental function likewise
in systems of comparative and genetic psychology and of "behavior-
ism. Watson, who stands for behaviorism as a substitute for
psychology, speaks constantly of the "sense functions", which
really include perception, as shown by some of the problems sug-
gested under such headings; e
.
g
.
,
"the role of vision in daily
life", and "the response to ordinary sounds in the animal's en-
20 21
vironment " . Baldwin, too, in his statement of genetic orob-
lems, emphasizes the fact of "functional epochs", or the child's
acquisition of knowledge through direct exoerience.
.7e may, then, summarize our historical survey by remark-
ing uoon the ">3 rsist ence through many centuries of the 'active'
and 'passive' vie'ws of perception. Until recent, more scientific
times, perception was either a power, a faculty, of the soul or
the mere reception of "impressions" to be connected and elaborated
by "association" or by the nervous system. Under the conjoint
influence of the other sciences and of experiment within osychol-
ogy itself, the dualism of active and passive has been softened,
but it still persists in the functional and analytical accounts of
perception. The one looks upon perception as a mental or osycho-
physical performance, oi use either to the organism or to know-
ledge; the otner describes it in terms oi integrated processes.
19. Judd, C.H., What is perception?, J. of .^hilos . , _?sych~ 1 L , %tc . ,
1909, vi, 36; Aaronson, I., Perception, ibid , 1914, xi, Wl>
20. Watson, J, B.
,
Behavior
,
"J.Y., 1914, 35-36.
21. Baldwin, J. M. , Mental development , U. Y. , 1895, Iff.

-11-
With these gross distinctions, historical and current, in view,
we turn now to an inspection of the actual problems and methods
which are to be found in tne recent literature of our subject.
This insnection will be a useful means to orientation within the
field of our own experimental studies.
B • A survey of perc "otion in modern psychology .
1. Kinds and classes.
In order to discover an adequate basis of classification,
let us review the treatment accorded our subject by such syste-
matic psychologists as 'Vundt
,
Ktilpe, Titchener, Angell, PillSbury,
Stout, and Ebbinghaus. Consonant with our historical summary,
we find, in these systems, that perceptions are classified either
as fa) modes 6i integration of component processes or fb) accord-
ing to the kinds of knowledge which they mediate.
(a) Classification of perception as modes of integration.
Wundt is one of the chief exponents of a distinction made
in terms of tne maimer of combination of the elementary processes.
22
Perceptions are, ior him, fusions, complications, and assimilations
An association of elements by fusion may be intensive or exten-
sive. By intensive fusion ne means that interconnection which
exists between processes by virtue of their qualitative relation-
ships; e.g. , the clang. This kind of affinity between mental
processes exists only among those arising from the same sense-
department and from sensory stimulation. The term 'fusion' is
extended to other forms, spatial and temporal, where it is desig-
nated as extensive. If the perception, on the other hand, arises
from a union of sensations from different sense-departments, as a
22. Op. cit. , 500 ff.
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I
percept ion of water from visual and cutaneous processes, then
it is known as a comolicat ion. These two modes of integration
account for perceotions that are composed of only present exper-
iences. There are, however, other perceotual Comdexes, in which
reoroduced experiences play an important Dart, as the perception
of any familiar object which contains more than the hare sensory
processes. Whenever image combines with sensation to form a
perception, the integraticn in known as an assimilation.
Kttlpe and Titchener also classify perceptions according to
the mode of integration of the component factors. The modes of
!
perceptual integration according to Kttlpe differ but slightly from
those of "undt . Kttlpe' s classification includes fusion, colliga-
23
tion, and association. Fusion is defined as a qualitative connec-
tion between elements when they are soatially and temporally iden-
tical; e.g.
,
if two notes are simultaneously given, the tones woulc
be temporally identical, but qualitatively diverse. Fusion, then,
from Kttlpe 's point of view is only one (the intensive) phase of
Wundt's fusion. The spatial and temporal perceptions are designat-
ed by Kttlpe as colligations. For example, the tone, a', repeated witl
I
alternately long and short intervals, would be an instance of iden-
tical quality, but of different temporal relations, and it would
fall accordingly into a temporal colligation rhythm. A pattern of
colors would illustrate the spatial kind of colligation. Further-
more, elements not only unite qualitatively, soatially, and tem-
porally, but they integrate also because each tends to establish
a relationship between itself and other processes. So arise
23. Kttlpe, 0., Srundriss der Dsycholo? ie, Leipzig, 1893, 284 ff.
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associative combinations.
According to kitchener, nercer>tions are distinguished
24
as qualitative, spatial, temporal, and mixed. The first three
would all be grouped as fusions, intensive and extensive, by
i,Yuiidt , while kitchener's mixed type is virtually equivalent to
Wundt's assimilation. But kitchener's qualitative perceptions
inc lude Wan dt ' s comolicati ons
.
In general then, with slignt limitations and expansions
of terminology, V/undt
,
Ktllpe, and kitchener make similar classi-
fication of perceptions. Their distinctions between kinds or
types depend mainly upon the capacity of the sensory orocesses
to integrate qualitatively, spatially, or temporally, or uoon the
fact of images attaching themselves to sensations to form oer-
ceot ions
.
fb) Classification of perceptions based uoon kind of
knowledge
.
A classification of perception from this noint of view
defends upon an interpretation of it from its functional asoect.
Stout, Angell, Pills bury, and BSbbinghatis treat it in this manner.
Stout enumerates five kinds: perception of external or nhysical
25
reality of space, time, causality, and 'thinghood'. A glance
at these terms will disclose the emphasis placed uoon the cogni-
tive function. In order to have any perception at all there must
be some external or ohysical object, even the body or its parts
becoming external to the self when cognized. Besides being ex-
ternal, every object must possess unity , identity , and inoeoendence
24. Qo. Git ., 389.
25. o . c i t . , 312.
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by virtue of which it is perceived as distinct from every other
object. This distinctness is designated 'thinghood'. further-
more, an object, besides being external to the organism and dis-
tinct from every other object, may also be thought of ascausality,
or as the result of a gradual, oractical adaptation, whereby,
through past experiences, the organism becomes aware of the ob-
ject's efficiency or inefficiency. In all of these categories of
percent ion, the importance of knowledge or information about
object? is the outstanding factor. Likewise, perceptions of
soace are such as have to do with information about some physical
object, for snace is a matter of relations in position and dis-
tance, and position and distance must pertain to objects. What
is true of soatial perceptions is also true of temporal; i.e.
,
time bears relation to something, to the past, nresent and future.
Like Stout, Angell, Pillsbury, and Ebbinghaus draw
distinctions between the large classes of oerceotion according to
the kind of knowledge derived. Angell, however, limits all t>er-
ceptions to two. main classes, spatial and temporal. Every per-
ceived object implies a spatial and a temporal order. Each
class has its own peculiar function: by means of soatial perceo-
tions the organism becomes accommodated to a three-dimensional
world; by means of temporal oerceotions, to a "world of sequen-
26
tial events". Thus, by virtue of knowledge concerning the
outside world acquired through the oerceotual functions the liv-
ing -being adjusts itself to its environment.
26. Angell, J. R.
,
Psychology
,
K. Y.
,
1908, 172.

Pillsbury does not vary much from Angell's position.
The chief concern is, he says, the tracing of "factors that aid in
27
the transformation of the sensations into objects." During thii
procedure, it is also necessary to keep in mind the way in which
"elementary mental states come to mean that wtLieh they are not."
For him, the meanings, or informations, are of much more importance
than the formation or integration of the perception* The kinds of
meanings, or knowledge, which are obtained by way of the nerceo-
tual process are fusions, and soatial and temporal relations.
Besides these, the mind may also become aware of movement, or
change, and of rhythm. The former is related both to snace and
time, the latter primarily to time. V/e see, then, that these
types of perception are not very different from those of Angell
and Stout. They stand related to those of the former in that
fusion, movement, and rhythm are perceived as parts of a snatial
and temporal order; to those of the latter by virtue 01 the fact
that in so far as adjustment and reaction to objects aid greatly
in the perception of them, objects as perceived, whether as fusions
movement, or rhythm, must oossess physical reality, causality, and
' thinghood '
.
Finally, the classification of Ebbinghaus, although it
appears to be of the first or integrative kind, is at bottom
functional. The general ( gemeinsame ) or formal attributes, unity,
28
identity, plurality, difference, and the like, which Ebbinghaus
assigns to sensations are really functional marks, so that his
account of perception is really not at all a descriotion of men-
tal processes but a description of the kinds of knowledge to which
27. Pills bury, T.V.3., The fundamentals of psychology ,11. Y. , 1916 , 269.
28. Ebbinghaus, H.
,
^rundztige tier ?sychologie
,
Leipzig, 1911, 1,442.
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perceptions give rise. Sbbinghaus has therefore to be grouped
with Stout, Pillsbury, and Angell, rather than with Wundt
,
iCfllpe
and xitchener.
In general, then, it may b3 said that the osychologists
who base their classification of perception inon kind of know-
ledge derived are emphasizing the functional aspect. Furthermore
this division of the types of "oerceptions may be as various, with
respect to terminology, as the relationships of object to object
and^ object to organism may suggest. On the other hand, those
who have dist inguished classes of perceotion upon the basic of
integration nave placed the main emphasis upon the fact that oer-
ceotion is an organized complex made up of elementary orocesses.
The recent insistence upon the adaptive functions of
mind leads the student of perception to look for a third kind of
classification which should take into account the facts of organ-
ic adjustment. Systematic work of this kind seems, however, not
to have been done. Where general terms have been demandec by the
biologising psychologist, the older, cognitive distinctions seem
to have been transferred to the ecolo?ic*il kind of function.
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2. Problems of Perception.
~
With this historical background in mind, let us turn
now to the empirical problems which the subject of perception
has presented, and then proceed to the methods employed for their
solution. The problems may be grouped under the following eight
headings
:
1. Dependence of perception upon variations of stimulus as
to its fa) Kind, (b) temporal peculiarit es
,
fc) spatial arrange-
ment, and (dj degree: perception is either f
1
1
) analyzed in
terms of process or (2 1 ) referred in terms of meaning to varia-
tions in stimulus.
2. Dependence of perception uoon organic conditions: (a)
general, and (b) local.
3. Deoendence of oerceotion uoon the general state or condi-
tion of mind.
4. Relation of nerce )tion to organic movement.
5. Deranged perceptions: synaesthesias
,
illusions, hallucina-
ti ons
.
6. Relation of oerceotion to thought.
29. For a basis of determination of the oroblems and methods of
perception, an oroximat ely loQ investigations were examined.
For this ouroose the .studies uoon oerceotion, reported in the
following periodicals, were scrutinized: Arner . J. of Psychol.
,
1903, xiv, —1916, xxvii; J. of Animal Behav.
, 1911, I,--1916,
vi; J. of Pnilos., fsycnol., ,:tc
,
1910, vii,--1916, xiii;
?sychol . Rev
.
, 1908, x'v, --1916, xxiii; 3rit. J. of Psj/chol.
,
19U4-05, I --191o-16. viii,£ts. 1, 2, 3; L 1 Anne e ? sj/ch ol . .
1910, xvi, --1914, xx; Arch, f. d. ges. ^sycnol
.
,
1909, xiv —
1915, xxxiv,- Psychol. Stud , , 1905-06, 1 .-- 1907, iii, l-Jll-12,
vii„ -1913-14
,
lx; Psychol. Index
,
191o, xxii (All references
quoted upon perception] ; and many other volumes and periodicals
not here ouoted.
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7. Hatuire of perception in animals.
8. Development of perception: fa) phylogenetic , and (b)
ontogenetic
.
An examination of the recent experimental literature
will serve both to define and to illustrate the numerous per-
ceptual problems which have already been formulated. We shall
take them in order.
1 . Dependence ox perception upon stimulus .
Tne problems of perception whicn depend upon the control of the
stimulus present many and various phases, since the stimulus
may be widely varied with resoect to its various characteristics.
The task then resolves itself into (!') the analytical descrip-
tion of the sensational and imaginai processes making up the Per-
ception under variations of stimulus, or (2* ) the correlation of
change in meaning with change in stimulus. Either of these modes
of interpretation of results ma:/ be the aim of the investigation
underany of the four Possibilities of modification which have
been distinguished.
(a) Dependence of perception upon change in kind of
stimulus. Under this sort of quest, the three remaining aspects
of stimulus, time, arrangement, and degree, are kept as constant
as possible, while modifications in kind are mad -3 under control,
in order to determine any difference in the perception which may
30
result. The investigation by Kemp upon tonal fusion furnishes
an excellent example of this part of the first problem. Two
notes, of unlike vibration rates, were presented to the observers,
who were instructed to compare the tonal complexes as regards
30. Kemo, W« , Methodisches und Experiment elles zur Lehre von der
jnversohmelzung, Arch, f. d. ?5St -sychol ., 1913 ,xxix , 139 .
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degree of fusion.
Experiments in which merely changes in meaning are
reported, and in which tne aim is to rs-er these changes to
modifications in the cnaraeter of the stimulus are illustrated
31
by Woodrowvs study of rnytnm. Tne influence of the intensive
and temporal factors was minimized or eliminated, thus producing
the most favorable conditions possible for correlations between
qualitative changes in perceotion and variations in the nature
of the stimulus.
(b) Denendence of perception upqn the temporal properties
of the stimulus. Perceptions of rhythm and intervals of time are
directly influenced by any temporal modifications in the stimulus
32
Experiments which illustrate this were devised by Boss and
33
.'.all in. In the first investigation, a series of ten clicks,
all at constant intervals with one exception, wherein the time wa
shortened, was provided. The task of the observer was to detect
the exceptional interval. The perception of this particular
duration was described only by its detection, when compared with
another constant time; i.e. , it was described only in terms of
meaning, not of process.
On the other hand, Tallin determined not only changes in
meaning, but also the processes which underlie the oerception.
31. Woodrow, H., R31e of pitch in rhythm, Psychol . Rev
,
1911,
xviii, 54.
32. Ross, F. B. , The measurement of time-sense as an element in
the sense of rhythm, ?sychol . Mono^.
,
1914, xvi (No. 69), 166.
33. 7,'allin, J. l.W. , Experimental studies of rhythm -and time,
Psychol. Rev.
,
1912, xix, 271.
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The ooservers were asked to find a tempo midway between two
others, one last and one slow. With the quantitative results
were also recorded comments made by the observers upon the aids
employed in the perception and the determination of the temporal
rate. V/allin reoorts, e.g.
,
that "four believed that they based
their estimations on the immediate impressions", "practically
all the subjects made use of the kinaesthetic factors", or again,
34
"only three were conscious of using any visual imagery". Althoug]
these comments are not true introspections made in terms of
process, they show more of a tendency in that dir action than the
reports of the observers in Ross' experiment.
(c) Dependence of Perception uoon the spatial arrange-
ment of stimulus. The possibilities of modifications in the
spatial pattern of stimulus are illustrated in many investiga-
tions into those perceptions which owe their configurations and
meanings primarily to the spatial arrangement oi the exciting
agency; e.g.
,
percent ions of lines, depth, size,and form. Such
an experiment as Miss Cook carried out uoon the cutaneous esti-
mation of filled and unfilled space, is a case in point.
35
Aesthesiomet ers for ounctal and continuous impressions were used.
The problem was to determine the amount of illusion present in
the comparison of filled and unfilled spaces, which assumes a
change of perception corresponding to a change in the spatial
relationships of the stimulus.
34. Ibid
.
, 295
.
35. Cook, Helen D. , Tie taktile Sch&tzung von ausgeflillt en und
leeren Strecken, Arch, f. d. ges. Psychol . , 1909-10, xvi , 442.
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We find, nowever, other investigators, describing the
perception ootn as meaning and as process. In an experiment upon
56
reversible drawings, Becher, e.g . , has discovered not only that
different meanings arise under spatial differences of stimulus
but also he has identified the mental processes which correspond
to these differences.
(d) Deoendence of perception uoon the degree of stimulus.
An investigation was conducted by Arcs and Xlemm for the nuroose
of determining this deoendence in the localization of sound. The
source of the sound was a tuninsr fork, which could be moved in
either the median or transverse olane of the head. The sound it-
self was transmitted to the observer by means of a telephonic
connection. The observer's task was to compare one sound with an-
other of like intensity but in a different position, or with a
sound at the same distance as the first, but of unequal intensity.
Since the duration and quality of the sound were constant, its
intensity was the determining factor for localization. The
problem of these two investigators was that of the second or
cognitive type, since it was concerned with spatial localization.
2. Dependence of p e rception uoon organic conditions: (a )
general, and fbj" local .
fa) The perception of an object may be greatly in-
fluenced by the general state of the organism. For example, one
38
experimenter, Jones, permitted himseli to be anesthetized vith
36. Becher, S. , Uber umkehrbare Zeichnungen, Arch, f. d. ges .
°Gychol.
,
1909-10, xvi , 397.
37. Aros, 5>F. & Xlemm, 0., Unt ersuchunaren fiber die Lokalisation von
Schallrsizen, Psychol. Stud ., 1912-13, viii, 226.
38. Jones, E.S., The waning of consciousness under chloroform,
'sychol. ?.ev., 1909, xvi. 48.
,
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chloroform in order that he might introspect ively observe the
effect uoon his mental orocesses. He found not only that percep-
tions were the first mental orocesses to drop out, but that these
also changed as they disappeared. For instance, he says that
"all movements made aooeared to be much longer than they actually
were", that "winking gave the Peculiar feeling of a great curtain
slowly shutting out the light and as slowly rolling back again",
and numerous other instances of oerceotions which were modified
by the anesthetized condition.
(b) Every perception depends upon the condition of its
particular sense organ, consequently modifications of local
organic conditions result in rr.odifications of the mental corre-
lates. Perceptions which indicate directly such an influence
are the difference in the perception of size by different oarts
of the retina, the Perception of the position of objects with the
head held at various angles, and the different perceptions of the
same pattern upon various parts of the skin. The first dec ends
upon the local conditions of the retina; the second, uoon organic
conditions within the head; the third, upon the distribution and
'local sign 1 of the pressure organs in various parts of the skin.
For illustration, we may cite Stevens' experiment uoon Peculiar-
39
ities of Peripheral Vision . By one of the psychophysical
methods, the author determined the perceived difference in the
size of the objects at different oarts of the retina.
39. St3vens, H. C
.
, Peculiarities of perioneral vision, Psychol .
Kev
. ,
190d, xv, 69.
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3. Dependence of perception upon the general state or
— JSL i — .., . , .... , — ... i — - Jk .—. — —
gonditlon of mind .
States of this sort are attention, expectation, doubt,
hesitation, and deliberation. The subject is s o predisposed when
stimulus is applied as to affect the perception. In reporting
an exoeriment uoon the influence of expectation uoon auditory
40localization, Teissier says "in our method the greatest
importance must be j.aid on the instructions given to the observ-
ers and the subsequent r^oorts demanded from them". In other
words, he had oreviously prepared his subjects to perceive the
object in a certain position, and nis task was to determine in
how far this mental set affected the perception.
4 . Relation of perception to organic movements.
In the three groups just reviewed, the task of the
investigator ended when he had established and described a per-
ceptual complex under certain conditions; but in the fourth group
emphasis is Placed less uoon sensory and imaginal components of
the perceptual consciousness than unon resultant and motor tenden-
cies which are sometimes alleged to be factors essential to oer-
41
ception. The followi ng quotation from Judd, who writes in
terms of "reaction" and "adjustment", will make the matter clear.
"The simplest perception of an object which is presented to the
eyes contains a great ueal more than the sensory elements of which
40. Teissier, L. R. , Sound localization under determined expecta-
tion, Amer. J. of ?syc no 1.
,
1915, xxvi , 269.
41. J."0ewey f +p . pit (maintains that perception is the result of
incipient and partial organic responses
.
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it is composed. It consists of certain forms of arrangement
and certain tendencies toward reaction which must be recognized
by any student who would work out an adequate account of these
processes." Partial or total "adjustments" are then, for Judd,
necessary factors in perception,
From what has just been said concerning the relation of
perception to organic movement, it is evident that such writers
as Judd are less concerned with the perception itself than with
events and occurrences concomitant with or subsequent to the
perceptual complex, with events which are really the final result
and not the components of perception. 'The chief interest in per-
ception, from this ooint of view, is a consideration of it as the
accommodation of the organism to its surroundings.
5 . Deranged perceptions: synaesthesias
,
illusions, hallucina -
t ions
.
Some of the problems developing from the study of de-
ranged Perceptions ore; fa) a description of the orocesses which
comprise the complex; (b) a description of meanings; and (c) an
explanation of the cause of such perceptions. This last problem
belongs primarily under the second group of problems, or the
dependence of perception upon organic condition. A description
of a derangeu. perception in terms of process is difficult, be-
cause of the inability and the limited reliability of intro-
spective reports under conditions where such derangements occur.
43
But referring again to the experiment by Jones, upon the in-
fluence of anaesthetics, we find from his own observations that
the distorted perceptions are the result of disturbed sensory
4 2 . Judd , J . H.
,
op . cit
.
,
40
.
43. Jones,']. E.
,
op . cit. , 51.
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processes; e . g. , he reported that, at first, the visual sensa-
tions were clearer and more intensive, wnile auditory and tactual
processes decreased in clearness, and his deranged perception of
movement was the probable sequence of the low intensity of
tactual sensations.
6 . Relation of perception to thought .
If perception bears any relation to thought, the relation
must be sought on the side of common properties either of
process or of function. With regard to composition, we might
expect to fine] like components and even similarities of inte-
gration. Thought might then be simply resolved into a greater
elaboration of meaning than perceo t i on , due to its greater com-
plexity of composition and differences of function of the com-
ponent processes. Thought would, from this point of view, be
distinguished from perception by degree of maaning rather than
as a different kind of mental phenomenon. On the side of func-
tion, common attributes and properties of the two activities must
be taken into account. If perception is considered as cognitive,
and thought as elaborative, then there is a wide distinction; bat
if we look upon perception as accomplishing something more than
mere apprehension, then we find that the two functions again
approach eacn other in nature. The problem, however, has never
44
received comprehensive treatment.
7 . The nature of perception in animals .
Here we find two main problems; first, a description of
the mind or or ganisms below man based u )on a corona rison with the
44. 7. Aveling (Relation of fho.ight- process and percept, Brit .
J. of "^sychol .
,
1911, ijfr, 213) considers the interrelations
of thought and the sensational processes as the problems
which underlie the relation of thought and perception.
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hunian mind, and secondly, the relation of animal performances
45
to perception* An experiment by Johnson will illustrate the
first. Monkeys and chicks were made to discriminate lines or
striae of different widths. Lirnens of discrimination were found
not only for these animals, but also for man and, by comparison,
the investigator arrived at a description of perception in these
animals. Other psychologists, however, who are interested in the
animal mind do not lay so much stress mon the analysis of per-
ception as a comolex. A description of perception as a performance
a behavior, or a response, and the direct correlation of this to
stimulus, suffices for their int eroretat ions and purposes. Among
46
others, ?/e find 7»atson taking this extreme view. This kind of
problem, we see, is entirely different from that of perception.
8 . Development of perception: (a) phylogenetic andfb)
o it o genetic .
The first group of problems, listed here, presents a large
field and a wide range. 'Zhe investigator who enters upon such a
task as determining the development of perception in the animal
phyla must possess much ingenuity and versatility in pursuing the
many problems which present themselves and in devising methods for
their solution. Here would be listed such problems as the modifi-
cation of perceptual complexes from the lowest to the highest
living form, a comparison of differences in perception with differ-
ences of nervous system, and a comparison of perception with other
45. Johnson, H. M. , Effective differences in width of visible
striae or the monkey and the chick, J. of Animal 3ehav.
, 1915
,
vl, 169.
46. ,/atson, J. B.
,
op . ci t ; pthers, as ^illsbury ( o p . c i t . ,14 ) do not
take such an extreme position.
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mental complexes at the various stages of develoornent in the
animal series. The ontogenetic development of perception, On
the other hand, does not include such a wide scooe, but limits
itself to tne study of perception within one organism from birth
to death. $he description of perception in its modifications from
a bare apprehension to a highly elaborate, cognitive ooeration
presents a suggestion for investigation in this field. Two
47investigators, Judd and Cowling, give us the barest kind of a
description of perception as the result of an inquiry into the
subject upon this very point. The gradual development of percep-
tion was determined, in their experiment, by the rate of learning
to reproduce certain outlined figures. This was performed, first,
with the eyes closed, secondly, with the eyes open and the draw-
ings hidden, and tnirdly, under visual control both of the move-
ments and of the drawings. We have already noted (Sec. 4 above)
that Judd is primarily interested in perception as described in
terms of 'reaction' and 'adjustment', and so again we marx the
characteristic failure of introspective description in the experi-
mant just mentioned.
If we glance in review, then, over the problems which are
concerned wi th perception, we see that they come under the eight
headings enumerated, which in turn may be further divided into
two large croups. The first would include the first four captions
tne second, the last four. The former large division treats of
47. Judo., C. H.
,
and Cowling, D. J., Studies in perceotual devel-
opment, ^syc.'iol . Rev
.
,
L'onog. Suo
.
, No. 34, 1907, viii, 349.
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oerception in its general relation fa) to the environment,
physical and bodily, and (b) to psychophysical Preparation or
predisposition. The last four groups may be classed together as
treating of specific problems in perception: (a) peculiarities
of perception, (b) relation of oerception to thought, fc) Percep-
tion in animals, and (d) the development of perception in the
individual and in the race.
3. Methods of investigation of oerception.
We have seen that the problems of perception are varied
and numerous, and that they correspond to different interests,
different points of view, and different modes of systematic
formulation. Nov/ as we advance to the discussion of methods and
means of solution we may reasonably exoect a like variety. The
means which have actually been used in the study of perception
we have collected from the journals and the monographs, and we .
find that they may be arranged under the following six categories;
fl) logical, (2) introspective, (3) psychophysical, (4) compara-
tive, (5) genetic, and (6) behavioristi c . The interpretations
48
put uoon these terms agree with those proposed by Ruckmich.
The first is a rational principle applied for the sake of inter-
pretation; the second, a method in the narrower sense; the third,
a mode ox procedure employex under experimental methods; and the
fourth, fifth, and sixth are primarily points of view.
1. The logical method is the term which I have used to
include all those procedures whereby unanalyzed experiences have
48. Ruckmich, 0. A., A schemu of method, Psychol. P.ev . , 1914 ,xxi
,
401.
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been brought together in the mass and by reflection int erDret ed.
It is the sort oi means which an investigator uses when he reasons
out descriptions oi mental exoeriences without subjecting them to
experimental control or even to experimental identification. It
is a general and uncontrolled manner oi investigation to which
psycho1qgists still resort. To illustrate the point, we may refer
49
to Aaronson's interpretation of the relation of perception to
knowledge and action, wherein he contends without experimental
verification that a man of the dullest type would show more know-
ledge than the most perfectly contrived mechanical being because
he is aole to comprehend the meaning of the perception and suit-
ably to adapt himself thereto. But there is no nint of experi-
mental control and no test of nr esuppoei tions . Again, an
oO
application of this same method is shown in Grttnbaum's analysis
of the psychophysiological nature of visual impressions of move-
ment in primitive man, where analogies are drawn between struc-
ture and mental event and between modern and primitive man.
Nevertheless , -in spite of its limitations,- the logical method
of interpretation and investigation finds a place in solving just
such problems as the last mentioned, wnere experimental control
is impossible. It finds further application, too , in the descrip-
tion and interpretation of conscious moments, which are common
to a groat mass of people; e.g. , the conception of an internation-
al war which brings the whole reading world into a single grouo.
49. Aaronson, I., Perception, J. of ?hilos
.
, ?sychol
. ,
gtc
.
, 1914
,
xi, 37.
50. Grrttnbaum, A.
,
Uebar die psychoohysiologische Natur des primi-
tiven Optischen Bewegungseindrucks , Falio Ileuro-bi ol . , 1915
ix, 699.
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Here again, a direct survey by experiment would hardly be feasible.
But in tne problems of percept ion the logical method should occupy
a subordinate place.
2. Intro s section is the one method, peculiar to psychology
alone. By it we mean the direct, controlled observation of mental
ohenomena for ourooses of analysis and description. From these
immediate observations the experimenter makes interpretations and
correlations of fact. The introspective method is, however,
interpreted, in two distinct ways; first, and orimarily, to analyze
and describe mental processes; and secondly, to indicate and esti-
mate meanings and relations, i .e.
,
to give information concerning
objects and to comment upon the or ogress of ©vent s.&) The first
application of the method is the one which has received a sanction
from modern systematic psychologists, as every kind of mental
event oresumably lends itself to this means of investigation.
There is no single kind of psychical material to which introsoec-
tion is limited, and therefore, facts gained by any other method
may be substantiated by the direct inspection of mind. Titchener
51has defined and outlined a schema of the introspective method
in which ne maintains that introspection includes "an attention
from the standpoint of psychology, and a record in the terms and
under the captions of psychology." He further proceeds to dis-
tinguish two forms of introspection, the direct and the indirect;
the first being an immediate description of the processes, the
second, a description made upon the basis of reoroduoed processes,
ol. Titchener, E. 3., The schema of introspection, Amer. J. of
°sychol.
,
1912, xxiii, 491.
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or memorial image. Titchener's account of introspection sub-
stantially agrees with G. S. Mttller's critical exposition of the
preceding year.
(b) The term introsoect ion, useu as a descrintion of
meanings, as a designation of knowledge about an object or as
running comments upon an experiment
;
do es not analyze in terms of
process. By its terms the observer reports fragmentary knowledge
of obje^cts and conditions. Take, for example, the problem of
the relation of thought to perception, investigated by Aveling.
The observers were subjected to certain conditions which they
reported as 'typical' or 'individual'. No attempt was further
made to analj/ze th3 processes which carried this meaning. A few
samples from the observations of Aveling' s observers will bring
out the difference between facts gained through the informative
method and the materials of introspection strictly taken. The
mere description of tne meaning is made evident by the following:
T
'I did not s je that as a type of a class. It was a letter-scale.
The bars were yellow, the support black. I cannot draw it; for
the meaning of the instruction came to me and troubled me. There
52. ivluller, S. E. , ziur Analyse der 5ed£chtnist&t igkeit und des
Vorst ellungsverlauf es , Zsch. f. ?sychol. u. ^hysiol. d. Sinnee
organe
,
1911, Ergbd. v, 64. In describing the method, Mailer
says, "Von Selbstwahrnehmun?- rede ich tlberall da, wo in
Seziehung auf einen osychischen Zustand durch unmittelbare
Auffassung desselben Oder durch Erinnerung an denselben etwas
konstatiert wird, ... 'Venn es sich um die Schilderung eines
Musseren Segenstandes handelt, kann die Beschreibung entweder
auf ^rund ges;enw3rt isrer Wahrnehmun? des Clegenstandes oder auf
Grand der Erinnerung an eine oder mehrere frtihere .Vahrnehmunger]
des jegenstandes erfol-ren. Findet die Beschreibung auf Srund
gegenwa*rt iger T"ahrnehmung statt, so steht es stets so, dasz die
zur Sehilderun? gelangenden Eigenschaft en oder Teile des Qegen-
standes sukzessiv die Aufmerksamkeit besitzen und ihren
3esonderheit en in allgemeinen an.^emessene, von sprechenden Wort -
en begleitete Apperzeot ionen (Erkennungen) erfahren."
o3. Oo.cit.,^£l.
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was an inhibition. Wo word cams to consciousness. I at once
thought of Nard'is 1 machine. Be had one." - - - "It was a pair
of bluish nippers. No word came to consciousness. They were
closed. I think I saw it as a oicture and as type."
The ^informative 1 type of the method, which principally
records running comments upon the experiment itself, falls as far
short oi describing consciousness in terms of processes as does
the related type just illustrated, which yields bits of knowledge
or reflection. Wo interpretation can be made concerning the
actual oompositlon of perception from confessions of the following
character: "I can't say much of the first stage. The oicture
rolls on, but doesn't take a final interpretation at first. I
feel there is a preparation for a definite final something. I
had confidence of something definite which would come uo when the
picture was gone. Ihen I sav.: other carts, and the previous inter-
pretation was choked down by this new sensation, and so the other
never appeared in full consciousness." - - - "It's an awful effort
54
to look at one thing. It's easier to be passive than active."
Such reports do not so much describe objects as merely comment
upon the attitude of the observer during the oeriod of experimenta
tion or upon the course of the experiment itself.
55
3. The psycnoonysioal met nods have played an important
role since Feehner's time. They are peculiarly adapted to the
study of relationships between stimulus and sensation. Since
perception has its origin in the direct stimulation of receotor
organs, all modes oi orocedure which may help illuminate the
54. Smith, I., An exoerimental investigation of perception, Brit .
J. of =>sycaol .
,
1913-14, vi
,
327, 333. tt
55. ij'or discussion see Titche tier B. B. , Experimental psychology,
.1—1 ., I. ?ft,; TT , Tntrnminti ,-, iur . v. .iqqr .
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relations obtaining betwetn stimulus and the attributes of sensa-
tion may be given a place in the study of this topic. The psy-
chophysical methods have most frequently b een applied to oercen-
tions in the visual, auditory, and cutaneous fields, but are
widely applicable where quantitative results are sought. An
illustration of a psychophysical mode of procedure would "be such
an experiment as the determination of the influence of accommoda-
56
tion and convergence upon the perception of depth, wherein the
amounts of accommodation and convergence may be accurately
measured and correlated with the degree of depth perceived; or,
the determination of the influence of expectation uoon localiza-
57
tion of sound by the number of errors made.
All the methods so far discussed are those peculiar to the
psychology of the human individual. The other three modes of
procedure which have helped solve problems of perception are the
tfiesc
comparative, genetic, and behavioristic . All of ^hiek may be
applied to organisms below man as well ls to man himself.
4. The comparative method takes a mode of procedure pecu-
liar to itself, namely that of inferring animal mind from human
mind. One necessarv step is a comparison of the animal and human
forms in respect to structure, functions, and behavior. Yfnen an
animal acts in a given manner under given conditions, the investi-
gator constructs the animal mind on the baste of a comparison with
human mind placed under similar circumstances, but with due allow-
56. Baird, J.W., The influence of accommodation and convergence,
/.::.?r. J. of Psychol .
,
1903, xiv, 150.
57. Teissier, L. R.
,
op. c i
t
.
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anees made for differences of structure, function and manner of
living. The literature upon animal psychology reveals many
illustrations of this method. A r eoresentat ive instance is
furnished by the article by Johnson already cited'.
3
Johnson first
determines the differ enoes necessary in certain patterns to be
perceived as discrete by both man and by the monkey and the chic!
He then constructs the mind of the lower animals by an analogy
to that of the human being.
5. SEJfoe genetic method may likewise be aoolied to animals.
An instance of an investigation carried on to determine the
ohylogenetic rel?.ti onshio of various organisms is furnished by
Hamilton.^ By subjecting various beings, as men and children
of various ages, monkeys, cats, dogs, and a horse, to the same
emblem under the same conditions, a comnariso n was a tt emr>t ed
between the reactions of the same species at different ages, and
between animals of different species. This manner of approach
is also ar>nlicable to oroblems dealing with the development with
in the individual. For example, the exoeriment of Judd and
60Gowling referred to above, presents the oroblem of the genetic
growth of perceotion in man with suggestions for a method for
it s s olut i on
.
An investigation of mind from the genetic point of view
is advocated by Xirkpat riok
,
Yerkes, and 3aldwin. According to
iCirkoat rick, the metnods of genetic and comparative ^sycholog-
08. Jonnson, H. M«
,
op. cit .
59. Hamilton, 3. V., A Study of trial and error reactions in
mammals, J. ox Animal Behav.
,
1911, i, 53.
60. Judd, 0. E. and Cowl in--, D.J., oo. cit .
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ists are similar. He believes that the student interested in
mental growth must first know the structure and behavior of the
simpler organisms and tnen, by inference, construct its mental
61 62
life. Yerkes, likewise, implies the use of inference in the
investigation of individual and racial mental development. Em-
phasis, however, is placeu repeatedly uoon the observation of
organisms, esoecially upon the observation of behavior and its
correlation with mental processes.
In Baldwin, D,Jwe find an entire program outlined and carried
through. He assumes that mental growth is parallel to the devel-
opment of the nervous system. The task involves a determination
of the amount of mental development at various levels in the
individual. The suggested manner of aoproach is that of the
64
aynamogenic method, or an interoretat ion of the development of
the mind by its reflection in movement.
6 . "he behavi oristic method does not attempt to describe men-
tal phenomena as does the comparative method. In its extreme st
form, it seeks only to describe movements and to r.^fer them to
antecedent stimuli. An illustration of this met.iod is to be
65found in an experiment by 3ingham, wherein no interpretation of
mental processes is attempted. Even in the milder forms of
behaviorism, perception is scarcely a problem in itself, but only
61. Airkpatric -t, E.A. , Genetic psychology , II. Y. , 1910, 3 .
62. Yerkes, R. M. , Introduction to psychology , 17. Y. ,1911,212.
63. Baldwin, J. M. , Mental development in the child and the race,
N. Y., 1895.
64. Ibid
. , p. 43.
65. Bingham, H. C
.
, Size and form perception in Callus Domest icus
,
J. of Animal Behav.
,
1913, ill, 65.
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in so far as it is implied in the description and explanation
of organic processes. And inmost uncompromising forms of this
brancn of ecological study, there is no place at all for the
66
or obi ems of perception.
Thus we find that various paths of approach are available
in connection with the problems of Perception; though only one
of them arrives at actual description in terms of orocess and
form of integration. Our six methods fall into two natural
groups. The first group, which includes the logical, introspec-
tive, and psychophysical forms, involves in various ways the
individual whose mind is under investigation. The psychologist
who makes use of the logical method bases his descriptions uoon
an analysis, more or less explicit and exact, of facts taken from
his own experiences; the osychologist who employs the psycho-
physical methods is dependent u:on the judgments of the observer;
while the int ro specti onist finds his facts of perception by
immediate observation.
The second group, which includes the comparative, genetic,
and behaviorist ic forms, is characterized by a orimary deoendence
upon the observation of overt actions or of other organic activ-
ities, tfrom this common start ing-ooint , the three diverge in
their several interpretations of behavior. The first emphasizes
the comparison of minds of different forms, the second, the
development of mind, and the third, the correlation of response
to stimulus.
66. Pillsbury f op . cit .14 ) , however, maintains that facts gained
from the observation of behavior should be substantiated by
int ro spection.
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GHAPTBR II.
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS.
A. An analysis of perceptual complexes.
Problem and method . Trie main purpose of these investigations
has been to obtain a descriptive analysis of perception. In the
first series of experiments the primary object was to study
certain fairly simple perceptual formations, laying special
emphasis in our description, (1 ) upon the kinds of orocess in-
volved, (2) upon the modes of their integration, and (3) upon the
temporal sequence of the component members. For this purpose,
6 7twelve series composed of ten irregular inkblots Vvrsre used.
68There were fine observers, 0, Ra, Ru,S f and V. The observer (0)
was seated four feet from the exposure apparatus, a modified
Whipple tachistoscope , which was employed throughout the experi-
ments. Two seconds after a "ready" signal, a card, bearing an
irregular inkblot (about 3x3 cm.) was exposed for .2 second.
The following instructions were given to 0.
67. These inkblots were similar to those used by 3. V. Dearborn
f A study of imaginations, Amer. J. of Psychol ., 189 7, ix, 183).
68. The observer's, who served in these experiments were fin
alohabetical order) a graduate student, Dr. Helen Clark fc )
;
an advanced undergraduate, Miss Helen Davis (Da); and five
instructors in the department, Dr. J. E. DeCamo (Dej, Dr. C.
Rahn (Ra), Dr. 0. A. Ruckmich (Ru), Dr. A. H. Sutherland (S),
and Dr. T. ?. Vance (V). The writer, takes this opportunity
to express her sincere appreciation of their services and
especially her indebtedness to Professor Bentley for his con-
structive criticism and supervision throughout the investigation.
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"Two seconds after a preparatory signal is :T iven , a visual
field will be exposed. After the exoosure, an auditory
distraction stimulus will be sounded. At the signal, fixate
and attend to the cross. After the exoosure Period, give fl)
an introspective aecount of all mental processes occurring
between the beginning of exposure and the distraction stimulus,
and (2) a verbal description of all objects perceived. 11
At each sitting, a series of ten cards was completed. The
twelve series were repeated twice, wholly or oartially, for
each observer, once with .25 second and once with .5 second
exoosure. The time of exposure was standardized by using s
single, 'standard' card, when timing the apparatus. After the
distraction stimulus, the introspections were recorded by the
experimenter, who asked such questions only as were needed to
clarify the reports. The O's were all given preliminary train-
ing on four seri es
t
similar to the main series, before the
twelve main series were begun.
Results . Prom our introspective reoorts we find that, for
the greater part, perceptual comolexes are -- under our condi-
tions -- composed of sensational and imaginal materials. A few
reores entat i ve introspections will illustrate the tyoe of reoort
and the critical analysis made of the experiences:
"First there was a comolex of visual sensations, which
meant nothing more than an inkblot of some form. The oerceotion
of these was not very cl^r. Then occurred a visual image of
the inkblot, very weak, but persistent. After the image, there
seemed to be a break in, the direction of attention. "During
this time there was a great deal of eye strain, which meant an
endeavor to clear up the meaning. The duration was inter-
mittent and its intensity, low. There were also some kinaesthe-
tic processes from the throat, but they were very vague and
brought no definite words." (S)
"The greyness values of the olot .vers very clear, but meant
nothing but an outline oi some sort. Then came a visual image
of a oicture of shoes. The soot then meant this, and the image
was assimilated right into the visual complex. Then came some

-39-
1 throat 1 kinaesthesis and visceral sensations, meaning an
endeavor to clear tip the meaning." (Ru)
Affective processes were very seldom noted, and then seemed
to "bo of minor importance for the perception, since they were
usually attached to some individual cormonent rather than to the
complex as a whole. Of the sensational processes, the visual, "by
virtue of direct initiation under stimulus, played an impor-
tant role in "the total oat tern, making un about twenty-six Percent*
of the total number of processes reported for all exposures by
all obLorvers. But when we find, further, that processes, indir-
ectly evokea. within the body, the organic and kinaesthetic sen-
sations, compose thirty-nine percent of the total number, those
directly evoked seem to become of relatively less primary impor-
tance .
V.'iien the organic sensations occurred, they were always
general, bat with two possible variations; first, the 'thoracic 1
and 'abdominal' processes were closely integrated, and not dis-
tinguishable, or secondly, they were not closely fused and either
one or the other stood out emphatically from the total complex.
These processes by themselves, however, form but a small part
(3$) of the entire group for all observers.
Kinaesthesis , on the other hand, represents the largest
percentage f thirty-six) of any particular class of mental phenom-
ena reported. Both muscular and tendinous sensations were ob-
served. The muscular changes involved may be classified with
respect to localization; they were either of the general, diffuse,
bodily type, or special ly localized in some definite part of the
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body. The classes of muscular sensations as given in the order
of frequency of occurrence are: general (474), ver bal ( 348 )
,
ocular (178), head (72), chest and face (each 3), neck (2)and
hand (l). The instances of tendinous strains are all very defih
itely localized in the eyes and head, with a frequency of 243.
Beside the sensational oroc esses, both directly and in-
directly evoked, introspection also reveals imaginal processes
of various classes, visual, auditory, kinaesthetic , and tactual.
All imaginal materials considered together form about a third
(35>J of all processes; the visual alone, kinaesthetic, 7 >;
auditory and tactual each, . 6>o. From these proportions, it ap-
pears that visual imagery is of importance in visual perceptions
The distribution of the various processes in the different tem-
poral phases for all observers is given in Table I.
The Table is a composite for 862 exposures of irregular
inkblots, distributed among five observers.
The perceptions of the 882 exposures are distributed into
94 different formations. These ;::odes of integration present
various distinctive natternings of the seventeen different kinds
of processes reported. Since there were 882 exposures, there
were 882 possibilities of formations. But with all these
possibilities, the fact that all can be ordered under 94 con-
figurations, is significant that Perceptions tend to conform to
typical integrations. Thirteen of the most typical patterns,
those with a frequency of eighteen or more, are given in Table
II. The total frequency of these thirteen configurations is 460
Thus, while there wag a possibility of 882 distinctively differ-
ent patterns, over o0,o conformed to thirteen integrations, or
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TABLE. JL.
TO FRtaUEHUf
PATTERNS.
1 79
I 75 YSF > (iENEWU-K\UR£5T\\ES\S > VI F
63
4 46 YSF > KmMt>Tv\t&\6. > V5D
(Heud , Eyes , Geneiw_ .YtRem.)
5 Zd Y5f > HuDrroR.Y-VtR.mi- Images.
6 IA Y5F > Straw 5** > VI F > Generkl Kmf\ESTKE.5\s.
7 2,3 Y5F > Av)DYVORY-N XtAKCxtt) > VI F
8 V5 F >V^j- / Auditory-Yer&rl Iwwys.
9
/VI D /
V5 F ^> VI r<-Yip / 1up\T0r\Y-YtRbH\- Imcvta.
Yip/
10 to V5F> VI r
11 V5 F > V$D//Gen£.rrv_ K\nre.s»thes\5. Csi*\m«v3 •
ia 18 V5F>VI F >VI
13 18. V5F /k2Swins«» > KwivwTftBtt, Geh^&Verm\->YIf>VIs
TOTKL. 460.

approximately to a seventh (14)&) of the total number of combina-
tions intrespectively revealed.
Those thirteen integrations further display striking simi-
larities among themselves. In Table III the:/ have been grouped
according to sameness of process, of mode of integration, an d of
functi on
.
1. Jroup I represents integrations of visual sensations,
kinaesthesis , and visual imagery. There is but slight variation
from formation to forma tion, the chief difference being one of
temporal sequence. General itinaestnesis stands out as one of the
essential factors in each pattern. In the last three, the diifuse,
bodily kinaesthesis is supplemented by special, localized kinaes-
thesis, as ocular and verbal. The visual imagery involved differs
as to cognitive elaboration. First, it may be simply the repro-
duced perception, or secondly, it may be imagery with derived
meaning
.
2. Srpup II represents formations of visual sensations and
visual and auditory - verbal imagery, xhe greatest difference
between the four oatterns is one of complexity with respect to
the number of processes; the second may be considered as a great-
er elaboration of the first, in that the second terminated with
a visual reproduction of the figure, which the first oerception
lacked. The remaining two formations are modifications of the
second in respect to temporal sequence.
3. orroup III is composed of oat one tyoe of integration.
It is distinctively set off from the other groups by the fact that
trie object itself, changes from being apprehended as a mere
irregular figure to one possessing a high degree of meaning.

TABLE JK.
Group PftTTERN5. Frequency
Total tor
Group. Percent-age.
i
VSF> GENERAL K\HFV£3TH£&\S> > VIr 15
68
£4
/
v^^K\Hat&m5t5 general ^Vers^^f^1 !: 1 8
x/<s 5TRMN ^.VIF /
VERBftt, STRATI AtNEtyU
79
2Jq\
2*8
VO F > f\vditory-Yelrbry. Imccs > YIr 2.3
Y5 F >
VIf
VIj) /Aud »T0RY
~Ye:rbri
-
Ita^es
Y5 F >VI F^ VI /Auditory-Yerc,^ -LwaciE5.
yip /
10
93
m V°F ^ (Head, Eyes ,G£m:f\iVL,YEiwu) ' 46 46 /o
us:
VS F > VI F £0
V5 F >VI F >VI P . 18
38 8
X 19 4
460 100
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4. Group IV is characterized by its absence of kinaesthetic
and organic processes. Introspection revealed nothing but visu-
al materials, sensational and imaginal. The second forms tion
differs from the first in degree of meaning, the first never
acquiring any more significance than that of an irregular, black
figure. The temporal sequence is identical, with the exception
that the second expanded into a third phase, in which derived
meaning appeared attached to visual imagery.
5. Grout) V bears a strong resemblance to Group III with
respect botn to composition and to the function of some of the
component processes. But there are also wide differences be-
tween the two groups as regards first, the function o± other
processes and secondly, the temporal course of the perception.
First, as to similarities, the complexes of both group* are com-
posed of visual and kinaesthetic sensations. Furthermore, the
sensations of both groups, which were directly evoked, bear not
only the meager meaning of an irregular figure, but also acquire
other significance. As to differences, first in regard to func-
tion, the kinaesthetic factors serve two distinct purposes, that
of effort or intent to seek meaning in the formations of Group
III, and that of empathic interpretation in those of Grouo V.
Secondly, there is a variation in temporal sequence. The visual
processes bearing the derived meaning came subsequent to the
kinaestnesis (effort) in the combinations of Grouo III, but
accompanied the empathic kinaestnesis in those of Group V.
The groupings of these various perceptual formations may
be determined not only upon the basis of similarity of combina-
tions of processes by all observers, but also upon the basis of
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tyoical integrative patterns for individuals. Group I is
characteristic of all observers (G, bfo; Ra,E0$3 Ru,5Cyj; S,
85$; V, 6 :j) ; Group IV, of three, Ru (o.j), S (6<o), and V (4 1) ;
Group V, of three, G (10$, Ra (37$), and S (8^); Group II, of
two, G (11$) and V (24$) ; Group III, of one, S (33^). V.re may
further car that the type of loercerttual pattern included in
Groun I is especially characteristic of Ru; that of Group II, of
V; of Grouo III, of 8; of Group V, of Ra; while observer G
displays a high frequency in both Groups II and V.
If the integrations should be combined with respect to func-
tion of processes, the lirst two would be closely related. Thile
the oroc esses of all but the first phase differ widely, first
as to type, - tnose of the first group being sensational, those
of the second imaginal, - and secondly, as to localisation, -
those of t he first being general, those of the second, special,
-
neverthelsss , the processes serve similar functions within the
perceptions. Botn the kinaesthetic sensations and the auditory-
verbal images perform the function either of bearing meaning or
of self-instruction to seek mean in;-? in the figure. The differ-
ence in process represents merely individual variations in the
interpretation of significance.
An examination of Tables II and Illreveals the following
facts
:
1. Visual sensations alone, for the greater part, compose
the first phase of the percept ion.
2. ICinaesthesis
,
general and soecial, is an important com-
ponent within most perceptual complexes and usually occurs in
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the second ohase.
5. With very few exceptions, imagery, especially visual,
occurs in every oerceotion, but its appearance is, for the greater
oart, comparatively late in the temporal course.
From Table I #e see that introspection revealed seventeen
different kinds of orocesses within the perceptual complexes.
Further investigation discloses the fact that these orocesses were
distributed over no less than five temporal phases within the per-
ceptions. Table IV represents the distribution of the various
processes, with respect to kind and function, in the five temporal
phases. The processes are arranged in each phase according to
their order of frequency, from the greatest to the least.
Thus, in the first temporal phase of the oerception, visual
sensations, bearing the ))£re apprehension of the black figure,
were the most frequent (835); the visual complex with derived
significance , s econd in frequency. (44); and so on. Bit parallel
orocesses in the various phases are not to be interpreted as of
approximately eoual frequency; e.g. , the occurrences of general
kinaesthesic (300) in the second phases are not as numerous as
those of VSf in the first. The tabl3 simply indicates the rela-
tive importance of each kind of mental phenomenon in each tempor-
al division of the total complex. While bodily kinaesthesis
occurs in each ohase, nevertheless it may be said to be most
characteristic of the second; i.e. , if it appears anywhere within
a perceptual integration, it is more ant to be subsequent to the
processes directly evoked. The Table IV further shows that the
accessory processes in every phase but the first are of much more
importance to the meaning oi the perception than the concomitant,

TABLE H
TEMPOREX. PHA6E
Order.
1 z 3 A 5.
\ V5 F KmRE5Trt£S\S SEN&RT\ONS.
VI n lv\
K\KRE&THES\5 !
t vlf vxp VI p 5En5RTi0YAS.
OCULRR
K\NA£5THE5I5
Verbku
KmAt5THE5lS
VERfcfU- GE.NERf\L
K) NAESTHE&I6
A
^UDITORr-VERBM.
I/*\RGERY. 5eK5aTI0M5
/\op»tory-Verb«u
XfARGiERY
ORQRmC
5EN5f\T\0n&
5
GE.ME.RFU-
KmAE5TKE5l5
A«JDtTORY-YER&«L GENEf\fU-
KVNRE5THES\5
AVD»TOTVr-VER»RL
XmGiERY.
6
VtRBRL KlNR£STHES»5
KlHRE6TKE6tS VI r
7 VI, 5ENSRXiON5
YERWU.
KmKE&TREStS
8 V5n
HEftD OCULRW
KmftESTHEStS
Y5D
,
RUOITORY iMft&ERY,
' | * m j4 link ii
1 ACTUAL 11
9 VI,
ORfiANtf1
5£NSFVT\OH5
J\od\t(W Imagery
Trctuhl •«
10 VSp Via
M Vis VI.
\l Via
KlHftESTHETtfl
Vehbiu. Kinesthetic
XMHGERV.
13.
chest ««
Tacturv. i«
HERD K\HAE*TnESlS
NECK "
14. V55
Strimh
Sensatiohs-
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directly initiated processes, i'or example, while the visual
sensational processes may possess significance other than merely
tnat of a blac£ area on white, in the second, third, and even
fourtn phase, nevertneless various other complexes have preced-
ence in frequency. Of course, with other materials, the percep-
tual value of the first phase might be greatly emphasized.
Perceptions, then, which arise from the observation of ink
blots, are composed of three fundamentally different kinds of
processes; fl) those directly evoked, (2) those which are related
to organic movement, and (3) imaginal materials coming from var-
ious sources. These have all been shown to be of primary impor-
tance to the perception, each discharging its own peculiar ser-
vice or supplementing that of other processes.
In this investigation, the visual complexes were found to
be performing four functions. First the object was anorehended,
eitner directly or indirectly, as being merely a black area on
whi t e.
"The visual complex simply meant an irregular figure of
some sort." (Ru)
This type of meaning we shall designate as the figurational func-
tion (VS_£ or VI^) . Secondly, the same comolexes were involved in
the ascription of other meaning, in depicting the figure as
some particular object ('VSd or VI d , depict ive function).
"The figure meant a bull-moose, horns and all very
definite." fS)'
These meanings were usually rejected one after the other.
Thus, although the function of these processes seemed to be
descriptively to elaborate and enrich meaning, nevertheless
they represent ef c ort and intent, on the Part of the observer,
to interpret the significance of the object. Thirdly, the visual

\ processes may not depict a ©articular object as a particular hill,
tree, or house, but may bear the meaning of a concent, as of
quadruped in general, or triangularity.
"In the perception, the object immediately became a genera]
representation for an animal like a centipede." (S)
We have designated this function as abstract (VS and VI ).
a a
Fourthly, the figure may be apprehended, not as some definite par-
ticular object, but as a reoresentat ion of an object, as a symbol
(VS and VI„, symbolic function).OS '
"The visual and auditory imagery carried the meaning that
this was a symbolic representation of a waterfall." (Ru)
Reference to Tables I and II reveals that in the perception
of figures, which possess nominal or slight meaning, the visual
processes more frequently display figurational and depictive func-
tions than abstract and symbolic. While the figurational and depic-
tive functions, taken togetaer, occur with approximately the same
irequency in the sensational (955) as in the imaginal (956) oro-
cesses, yet tners is a decided difference when considered separate-
ly} 835 of the visual sensational complexes were figurational and
but 1E0 depictive, while
;
in the case of imagery, 510 were figura-
tional and 446 depictive, thus indicating that imagery may be of
slightly more importance than sensations in giving derived signif-
Iicance
.
Likewise, in the case of abstract and symbolic functions,
there is a greater frequency in imagery than in sensations. Thus,
the primary function of the directly initiated processes becomes
one of bare apprehension of object, while that of imaginal mater-
ials is to elaborate upon the meaning.
Whatever meaning the perception possessed usually came wit]
I
the visual complexes. The kinaesthetic and organic processes,
—

Isensational ana imaginal, did little to add to or substantiate
it. Their chief function was (l) to bear effort or intent to
find significance in the figure, or (2) to question the fitness
of meaning ascrioed by other processes. Thus, they were accessory
to tne visual complexes rather than directly assimilated with them.
Group V of Table III, however, is an exceotion to this kind, of
function. In this mode of integration the emoathic kinaesthesis
substantiated the meaning attached to the visual sensations, thus
actually disolaying a deoictive function, although the inter-
pretative function is still evident.
The auditory and tactual imagery perform a service similar
to that of the organic and kinaesthetic processes; i.e.
,
they
carry self-instructions to seek meaning in the figure, or to
determine the aplpropriativeness of significance. They primarily
represent individual differences in the observers in the inter-
pr etation of the figures. Auditory and auditory-verbal imagery in
the cases of G and V, and tactual imagery in the case of Ra, dis-
oharge tne same office as kinaesthetic orocesses do lor other
observers and frequently for these same observers.
Summarizing our experimental results thus far presented, we
may say that perceptions have a tendency to integrate into certain
typical formations, which oossess some peculiarities due to in-
dividual differences, but which nevertheless conform in general
to common patterns. Within these configurations , the various
orocesses follow a temporal course fairly definitely determined;
the directly evoked sensations showing a marked precedence over
all others in the first phase, the indirectly initiated sensational
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complexea composing the greater oart of the second, and imaginal
phenomena having oredominance in the third. The different
processes . which compose the oerception, also oerform particular
function: ; the visual -processes hear the meaning, while those
connected with organic movement and the imaprinal components inter-
pret any significance which the figure may possess or derive.
B. The elaboration of perceptual meaning.
Problem a nd method. Typical integrations having been
established for perceptions of figures with very slight or nominal
significance , it became the primary task of this immediate part
of the investigation to determine whether any change occurs in
oerception when material with a slightly higher degree of signifi-
cance is used. JPor tnis purpose, we availed ourselves of any
suggestions which we might get from hieroglyohics and cubists'
drawings. A series of 50 cards was made, bearing objects which
possessed varying degrees of suggest ea meaning. The following
illustrations are typical of the series.
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These were exposed for half a second to the observers, 0, Ra,
and
Ru. The instructions were as follows:
"Two seconds after a "read/ signal , a figure will be
briefly exposed. A distraction will be given at the end^of
two
seconds. Uoon distraction, report at once whether tne figure
is wholly devoid oi significance. Then give full
introspections...
Results . Bo difference in composition was discovered
between the perception of inkblots with minimal meaning
and the
oerce^tion of figures possessing a greater degree of
significance
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The complexes also revealed integration similar to that of the
first set. But, although there is no difference on the side
of composition, there is a marked variance in the function of the
different processes. Whereas in the perceptions, reported under
the first experiment, the orocesses all bore the same general
function of seekingand interpreting meaning, the same processes also
serve other purpps es when the object becomes more meaningful. In
this series of Investigations, we have distinguished three kinds,
interpretative, appreciative, and orientating.
The interpretative function is the same type that we found
so prevalent in the perceptions of the first experiment. It is
the effort or intent on the part of the observer to read mean-
ing into the object. The following excerots will illustrate its
application as related to various types and classes of mental
phenomena
:
"I felt myself (general, empathic, kinaesthesis ) standing
erect and rigid, and then tne meaning grass came. '.' (0)
"There was a very clear auditory image of the word "bowl"
and with it a general kinaesthetic set which meant the realization
that the object was not like a bowl, kinaesthesis of the hands
and tactual imagery gave roundness to the too." (0)
"There was much organic disturbance, which meant that
the figure was comolex, that it was a problem, which I must solve.'
(Ru)
"Visual images assimilated with visual sensations gave
the meaning of solidity.'* (Ra)
These illustrations not only indicate a similarity to the
int eror etative function of the processes in experiment 1, but also
a difference. In experiment 1 we found that the interpretation
was of the desiring', seeking, searching type without any satisfac-
tory fulfillment, i.e. . if derived meaning* <*id occur as a result
of the search, they were usually rejected or at least not wholly

accepted. In exoeriment 2 we see from the illustrations quoted
that there was an intent and desire to derive meaning, whir;h 7/as,
however, not so much a futile seeking and searching as the kind
of interpretation that comes with fulfilled desire and satisfac-
tory realization.
Both sensat ional and imaginal component processes may
serve to seek meaning in the obj?ct. The sensations, which
function in this manner may have a definite (visual) or general
(organic and kina estheti c ) origi n . In the cse of imagery, the
materials are drawn from various sources, specific, as visual,
auditory, and olfactory, or general, as tactual and kina esthet ic
.
The interpretative function, then, is not peculiar to a oarticula:
class of mental phenomena, although effort itself is directly
connected with kinaesth esis
.
The second, or aporeciative function, is the term we have
emoloyed to designate the service of a orocess or complex of
processes when the figure is valued, i.e. , when it gives rise to
pleasure, enjoyment, or aesthetic sentiments. Examples follow.
"There was a general, kinaesthetic and organic complex,
meaning amusement because the do?* was so fantastic and that it
was so ridiculous for a live dog." (C)
"There were numerous visual images of scalps, skins and of
tortoise shell corahs of varies tec! colors, *"ith this -as a
pleasant ore: nic comolex. The total comolex signified the rich-
ness of meaning of the object." (Ru)
"There was a background of visual imagery, associations
from the history of man, carrying an appreciation of the feeling
of unity with man." (Ha)
The moaning in each case seems to have been comoletely
evolved by antecedent processes, and when the phenomena ,rnent ioned
above, appeared, their primary function was to appreciate this
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significance
.
As regards the int erpretative function, we found that
any kind of mental phenomena might fill such an office, whereas
only tne indirectly evoked sensations (organic and kinaesthetic
)
and imaginal processes carry the appreciative function and more-
over that tne imaginal processes wnich here functionate as
appreciation are limited to the two classes, visual and kinaes-
thetic verbal. This would seem to indicate either, (l) that the
meaning of these perceptions was not yet complex or evident enough
to involve many processes in appreciation, hut still demanded much
interoretat ion, or (2) that fewer kinds of process actually oer-
form this valuat ing or estimating service.
The orientating function is a third kind of performance
distinctive from either the interpretative or the appreciative.
There is no effort or attempt involved to attach puroort to the
obiect, nor is there anv valuation of such meaning as may be
present, bat the processes functionate in placing or localizing
in time or space the object with reference either to the observer
or to other objects.
"There were some organic processes in the background,
allied with kinaesthetic processes which gave the object
position." (Ru)
"There was confused visual imagery referring to drawing
classes where they had drawings of friezes, of Egyptian designs,
and of Greek and Roman figures." (0)
"Tnere came an auditory image of the words , "bizarre
twist': which was accompanied by auditory imagery referring it
back to other diagrams, wh'ch. meant bizarre twist." (Hu)
"Tnis reference to books on archeology came in terms
of visual imagery of pictures and kina esthetic-tactual imagery
of the feel of the page with orint and oictures." (Ha)
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Ihe orientating- function, then, is characteristic of
organic and kinaest&etie sensations and of imaginal processes
from various sources. Of the images which are derived from
definite sources, we find the visual and auditory occurring;
of those with a diffuse origin, the tactual and kinaesthet ic
.
Although three kinds of functions may be assigned to the
various processes, nevertheless, as far as our results indicate,
we cannot say that functions are of equal importance in giving
meaning to the perception. In Table V. ike total number of
processes has been recorded under each function with resnect to
its capacity for carrying these three kinds of significance. The
interpretative, appreciative, and orientating functions are indi-
cated by I, A, and 0, respectively. The symbols , + and -, indicate
whether or not processes, discharging particular functions, added
to the signiiicance of the perceptions, - a significance, which
had already been derived; e.g. , the meaning 'horn' is alreadv
attacned to a visual complex, when an auditory image of the word
horn subsequently occurs. The latter supplies nothing new to the
cont ext
.
From an inspection of Table V, we may conclude from these
experiments that:
1. In perceptions possessing a moderate decree of meaning,
processes, serving for interpretation, are approximately twice
as frequent (436) as processes which valuate and localize (241)
the object. This observation ooints to the fact that the meaning
was not so evident but that most of the components in the Percep-
tual process stood for effort or intent to attach significance to
the figure.
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I FK A.&.0 X a a&o.
Observers. + v- +
c 2.7 2.1 o 4Z 17 63 I 179 2.1 59 80
2
tt
)rO
77 la a 1 15 9 £3 10 85 9 24 33
in
- 1
96 66 35 1 5? 35 36 )62 36 92.
c
w
59 10 a 16 7 2.4 7 69 8 2.3 31
a:
h-
bJ 60 14 6 ,8 12. 7 18 7.8 74 6.8 19 S5.&
u
ui
Q-
33 2.3 \Z .3 2.0 XL 32, 12..3 56 12.3 32. 44.3
TOTRLS 325 III 64 a )K 61 178 63 436 66 175 2.41
Fercentaqes 48 16 9 .3 17 9 2.6 9.3 64 9.3 2,6 35.3
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2. livery kind of eomponent in the perception shows a
greater tendency to be positive rather than negative to the
meaning; i.e.
,
in every instance, the oroc esses which contributed
to the meaning greatly outnumber those which failed to enlarge
the significance. All of the ' aopreciat ive 1 processes, with two
exceptions, enricned meaning. The phenomena which localized the
object, now ever, made no contribution to the meaning about half
as frequently as they added thereto. Although we have said that
orocesses add or fail to add meaning, we cannot say how much eacn
process contributes to the significance of each oerceotion. tfor
example, - to take a tyoical illustration, - we perceive an ir-
regular figure which assumes the derived meaning oi cannon, by
virtue of the visual sensations themselves. Then calls forth
a visual imags of this s-oot, still possessing the meaning cannon.
In this instance, it is evident that the sensations were of much
more importance to the meaning than the images, and: that although
there ware two types of process we cannot say that each contri-
buted one-half the meaning. Meaning itself is 'richer', 'ooorer',
'more or less elaborated'; but it is not divisible into fractional
parts.
3. After the interpretative processes have run their
course, other processes nave a greater tendency to serve in
placing the object in space and time than for aopreciating it.
There are approximately three times as many "0" as "A" processes.
4. from the general results of Table V, there seems to be
a temooral evolution of the various functions of orocess from
oeroeptions with minimal meaning to those with considerable mean-
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ing. fhen meaning is minimal, the processes serve for bearing
and interpreting it. As meaning becomes more elbborate, the
processes acquire other functions, first th t of localisation,
and secondly that of appreciation.
Table V also reveals some individual differences with
resoect to the functional asoect of mental phenomena.
1. The "I" processes vary from 56$ for Ru to 14$ for Ha.
(This difference should be considered in connection with Table VI
below.
)
2. Ru shews a higher ratio between his "0" and MA Tt process-
es and his "I" processes than either C or Ra.
3. There are also marked differences with respect to the
relation of the processes to the moaning. Ru has approximately
as many "A" and "0" as 'I" processes which add to the meaning,
while and Ra snow a oredominance of positive "I" processes. In
Ru's perceptions also, the "I", "A", and "0" processes which do
not add to the meaning have a lower ratio to those that are
oositive than is true in the case either of C or Ra
.
We have seen that there is a tendency for the "A" and "0"
processes to increase in frequency as meaning becomes more ela-
borate. In our next table (VI) this relationship of process to
degree of meaning becomes more clearly apparent. Here the mean- I
ing of the object has been designated as "none", if it possessed
no significance other than that of a black area on white. It will
be recalled that this series was purposely so made as to bear
varying degrees of suggestion. "Slight" indicates that there was
present a low degree of meaning, which was usually indicated by
hesitation on the part of the observer to acceet it, or by lack

TABLE YE.
None
Observers I I a I A KM
c z 58 5 18 2.3 108 16 39 55
3
tC
L—
r
o
7 3 3 26 2, 7 3 62. 7 \A
— H
2.7 U.VJ
C
cC
5 ,6 .8 zz Z 7 9 AZ 6 15 2,1
1-
-Z-
g
5 2. Z to z 5 7 49 5 n 16
a
\1 3 8 12, 39 10 2,2 32.
TOTALS 19 5 5 52, 67 2.85 51 118 i68
Percentages 3 .7 .7 19 8 10 A\ 8 /8 2.6

-56-
of details, or by the predominant function of all the processes
involved. "Much" indicates that the object was rich in detail
and setting.
In the case of "no" meaning, the results quoted in
Table VI show that but few processes with the orientating function
occurred and none of the appreciative type. But in perceptions,
which possess "slight "meaning , there is a greater frequency both
of the"A" and "0" kinds of pro 1 cess with a greater prevalence of
the "0" type. The same is true of complexes listed under the third
degree of meaning. This further substantiates the statement made
above that as meaning develops more and more the accessory com-
ponents of the §>eroe otion acquire new functions, namely, the
orientating and the appreciative. The processes discharging these
services also vary directly in frequency with the significance.
Table VI farther shows that, if judged by freouency, the same
classes of orocess assume the orientating function before the
appreciative; i.e. , in the instances of "no" meaning, there were
but few "0" processes, and no "A" processes, while in the other
instances, the "0" processes always exceed the "A's". This fact
illuminates the reason for Eu's displaying such a high frequency
of "A" and "0" processes (Table V). From Table VI, we see that
Ru reported no perception under the "none" degree of meaning.
These facts accord with those Of the first series of
experiments, where, with the sxcept ion of the perceptual inte-
grations listed under Sroup V of Table III, all accessory pro-
cesses presented clearly the interpretative function, since the
figures used in those experiments possessed just as little mean-
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ing as oossible. In tha case of perceptions, which involved
empathic kinaesthesi s , which was mostly interoretative , but
with a suggestion of the looalizing function, the objects rere
probably of the same decree of meaning for the various observers
as those Judged as having ''no" meaning in the second -series of
'object' cards.
The following general conclusions may be drawn from the
results of exoeriment 2:
1. The accessory processes, kinaestnetic and organic sen-
sations and various imagine 1 components, acquire functions other
than the interpretative, as meaning grows more elaborate. In
this experiment these new services have been found to be appreci-
ative and orientating.
2. The accessory processes, performing these appreciative
and orientating services, increase in frequency directly with
the degree of meaning.
3. The various functions of mental or oc esses appear in a
definite order, in perceptions of varying degrees of meaning;
fl) int er oretat ive , (2) orientating, and (3) appreciative.
0. Relation &t attention to perception.
Up to this point our experimental results have shown
us, first, that perceptions fall into typical integrations,
secondly, that perceptions present various degrees of cognitive
and aopreciate elaborations, and thirdly, that the elaboration
of significance is relatively independent of tne particular kind
of mental processes involved. But our analytic problem is not
yet complete. We must not neglect the state and the configuratio
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of the total bit of mind in which the perceptual complex is
embedded. Shis is the problem of the relation of attention to
perception. We approach it by taking an inventory of all the
processes, at their several degrees of clearness, which lie both
within and without the particular constellation which we have
undertaken to study.
A. Preliminary series.
Problem and metiod . In order to train our subjects to observe
these degrees of clearness or vividness, two series of preliminary
experiments with distraction were performed. In the first, a
series of nonsense-syllables was exposed, ap nroximat ely one each
second, which was to be memorized by the observer. Some time
during the learning period a distraction was offered b:/ drawing
a pattern uion the back of O's left hand with the blunt end of a
oen shaft. At a signal ''now' 1 , introspected for that instant,
estimating the various orocesses according to nine degrees of
clearness
.
The second series of experiment consisted of a double
task. 0. was given one of the cancellation test-sheets and asked
to mark all "a's". While he was thus engaged, simple arithmetical
sums and multiplications were orally given and their solution de-
manded. At a signal "now" full introspecti or& were reoorted with
respect to the clearness of the processes, which were present just
at the signal "now". The experimenter in both series always
attempted to give the signal "now", while the observers were be-
ing distracted either by the pattern or by tne computation.
The instructions for the first series read as follows:
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"A "ready" signal will be given. Two seconds later, the
first of a series of nonsense syllables will be ex-oosed. Learn
the series. During the learning oeriod, a distraction will be
given by drawing a pattern on the back of your hand. At a signal
"now", give an introspective account of the degrees of clearness
of all processes, present at the signal "now". The degrees of
clearness are to be judged in the following terms:
maximally clear 1
very clear 2
clear 3
fairly clear 4
fair 5
fairly vague 6
vague 7
very vague 8
obscure 9."
Instructions for the second series were:
"A "ready" signal will De given. Two seconds later a
signal "start", at which oegin crossing out the "a's" on the sheet
before you. During this process, simple arithmetical additions
and multiplications will be given for about two seconds. At a
signal "now", give an introsoect ive account oi the degrees of
clearness of all the processes, present just at the signal "now".
Tne degrees of clearness are to be judged in the following terms;
(the same 9 degrees were used as for the first series)."
The observers were 0, "De, Ha, and Hu.
Result
s
. The two preliminary series of experiments re-
sulted not only in training the O's in the use of the degrees of
clearness, but also determined the type of consciousness of each
observer, whether it was of the foreground-background type or
multi-level. Graphs I - IV, showing the results for nonsense-
syllables, illustrate individual differences.
In the graphs, the trials are ordered on the abscissae; the
degrees of clearness on the ordinates. Adjoining degrees are
connected by solid vertical lines.
Tne diagrams then suggest that C and Ra
t
and possibly also
De, represent multilevel types of mind. The data for the double
task series indicate results similar to those for the first series.
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3otn are included in Table VII. The symbols
, "if-g" and "A " on
Table VII are employed to reoresent the nonsense-syllables and
the cancellation sheet , respect ively. It may be said in general
that the observers exhibit a similar distribution of oroeesses
among the nine degrees of clearness with the exception of Ru,
whose two-level division reduces the numbers for the medium and
the very- lowest degrees. And again, when Ru's estimations of
vividness are divided into three large groups (for the sake of
inspection), there is oractically an equal distribution for each
group. Ra, while he grouoed most oroeesses in the middle level
for the series, nevertheless exhibits a greater frequency
among the aiaximally clear than among the obscure processes. In
his "A" series, very clear processes are more frequent than those
which are moderately clear, with still fewer obscure comoonents.
The general tendency ior all observers seems to indicate that
most iactors within tne perceptual complexes are moderately clear,
fewer are obscure, and a still smaller number maximally clear.
B. Main series.
Problem and method. The primary task of this investigation was
to estimate the bearing of clearness uoon perception. To this
end, the original series of inkblots (see experiment 1) was again
used. As before the observer save full int roso ecti ve reports con-
cerning the oerceotion, but in addition the clearness of each
process was sriven on the scale of 1 - 9 according to the method
employed with nonsense syllables and the literal tests of our
preliminaries.
The instructions read:
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"Signal, exposure and distraction-stimulus will be siven
as before. During the whole neriod of observation take the oer-
ceiotion quite passively; do not force an "object". Oive full
introsr>9ctions
,
indicating nerceot ions and other meanings in
oarallel with the description of processes. The introsoections
should include fa) analysis of complexes, fb) the sequence and
order of ^rouos, and fc) the area of maximal clearness. The de-
grees of clearness are to be judged in the following terms: See
instructions for preliminary series."
The time of exposure was half a second, but introspection cover-
ed a period of two seconds. C, De
,
Ra,and Ru served as observers.
Results. Tables VIII - AI present a tabulation by observ-
ers v^ith respect to kind of process, degree of clearness ,and
phase of oerceotion. They include only orocesses relevant to
the perception and not those of the total mind.
When the various kinds of orocess are considered with
regard to their frequency, in the nine classes, wide individual
variations in relative clearness appear; but they largely dis-
appear again when the nine degrees are reduced to three. For
example, we find noon inspection of the Tables that the visual
sensory coranlexes occurred fairly well distributed under the
nine values for and Ra, while they all belonged to Ru's area
of maximal clarity, and with few excentions in the range of
moderately clear components for De. And again, with reference
to the kinaesthetic complexes, which are common factors for all
observers, there is a decided tendency for them to be of very
low level in the case of 0, but of moderate clearness for all
others. The extent oi distribution does seem to bear some rela-
tion to the predominant type of process; e.g.
, 0, De t and Ra, who
reported visual sensations under at least seven of the nine
categories, possess a predominance of visual sensations over
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visual imaginal complexes, while Ru, who reported no visual sen-
sations of less than degree 3, shows a slightly higher percentage
of visual imagery than of sensational material. But no fixed
relation as. regards relative clearness of sensation and image of
the kinaesthetic kind can be made out, oossibly because these
orocesses are all alike, - as some writers contend, - sensational
in character. Again, no constant relation obtains between the
clearness of sensations directly evoked and the frequency and
clearness of those indirect_ly initiated. For example, C, whose
visual processes range from 1 to 9 degrees in clearness, reveals
a higher percentage of kinaesthe sis , while Ru, who reported visual
processes only as of the highest degrees, also possesses a much
higher percentage (39) of kinaesthetic than of visual sensations
(17). Neitner is there apparent a direct relationship between
the vividness of visual and of kinaesthetic sensations, In G's
case, where the visual processes were wiaely distributed, kin-
aesthesis showed a tendency to run very low in clearness, whereas
J
in the case ot hu, where tha visual processes were concentrated
at a high level, the Kinaestnetic sensations were distributed,
for the greater part, over the middle values. The directly and
indirectly initiated sensations then seem to vary independently
of each other both as to frequency and to clearness.
If, now, we consider all degrees of clearness under
three large groups, maximally clear, moderately clear, and obscure
a grouping which our preliminary experiments seem to justify, then
these wide irregularities in large measure disappear. The differ-
ence is revealed in Table XII which brings together the footings
of t ie individual results (in Tables VIII - XI). The highest

table: sn.
Clewhess Values TOTR.US FOR RUV-VrvvJW
Observers 1 2, 3 4 5 6 7 a 3 THA5E5.
1
a
TOTALS
7 54 70 57 34 59 96 106 71 196 2.15 141
Of 3 18 2.5 32. 2.3 17 32, 8 10\ 4-0TV/ \7
30 67 38 2.9 2.3 2.3 13 4 1 *JsJ n
Ru. I5\ 2.16 3 114 54 39 316 2.96 1\7
C
Percent^
1 10 13 10 6 \\ 17 19 13 36 39 2,5
Dt 2, 11 16 2,0 15 n 2,0 5 64 2.5 \\
13 2,9 166 13 to 10 6 £. 4 49 4i 6
Ru 17 2,1 30 4 7 5 4 43 41 16
TOTRLb 2,75 114 2,03 159 165 170 80 72.7 652. 2.92.
FtRtEHTflCES /o 16 2,0 7 12, 10 10 10 5 44 39 17
ToTRV-S »N
3 Levels 438 818 415
2,6 49 2.5
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frequency (49;o) falls within the field of moderate clearness,
while the other regions are, in the totals, virtually the same
(26,o and 25%). All observers agree in the large number of
processes of moderate clearness; though they differ in distribu-
tion to the two extremes of clarity and obscurity.
There is a change in the organization of perception
not only when viewed in cross-section, but also when regarded in
its temporal course. We recall from Experiment 1, that oroceeses
indirectly evoked compose almost exclusively every phase but the
first, furthermore, the results of Experiment 3 show that these
indirectly initiated orocesses are generally less clear than the
visual sensations, which, in a large measure, occupy the focus
of attention. Tnus the perceotion temporally undergoes a reor-
ganization not only with respect to kind of process but also in
regard to the degree of clarity of the various components. In the
first phase are usually to be found only visual sensations, out
of maximal clearness, while in the second there are, as a rule,
accessory processes, but standing at a lower level of clearness.
Tnis fact seems to indicate a decrease in clearness from phase to
phase of the perceptual complex. In Table XIII we have con-
structed a tabulation to show the relation of clearness between
the processes of the first and second, and of the second and third
phases of oerception.
In order to maintain a constant standard, the changes
were determined by the relation of the highest clearness values
assigned in the two Phases under comoarison; e. a:. , if both the
first and second phases oossessed processes of the first degree,
then they were considered as having undergone no change, but if
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the first phase contained a process of decree 1, and the highest
of the second phase was of degree 2, it was considered as a de-
crease in clearness. G, for instance, out of 88 perceptions
reported 50 decreases in clearness between the first and second
phases, 25 increases, and 13 wherein there were no changes. The
symbols -, +, and signify a decrease, increase^or no change^
res? ect ively
.
Table XIII shows, then, that there is always a greater
frequency of decreases in clearness than of increases or oersis-
tenc3S. This observation indicates that oerceotion undergoes a
change in clearness from Dhase to ohase, usually a decrease.
But tne perceptual complex suffers not only with resoect
to clearness from phase to phase, but also in number of comoonents
Inspection of the last three columns of Table XII will make it
evident that, with the exception of C, every phase is less rich in
processes than the one preceding. Thus perception declines in both
clearness and in complexity of component members.
From this investigation we may draw the following con-
clusions :
1. The various areas of clearness within the perceptual complex,
viewed in cross-section, differ to the frequency of processes.
The region of moderate clarity abounds in the greater number of
components, while the areas oi focal distinctness and obscurity
each contribute but about half the number of the middle region to
tne perception. Tnere were many more pro cesses , however , in the ob-
scure background whicn were wholly irrelevant to the oerceotion,
and have therefore not been included.
2. In oerceotion, each large region of clearness also shows
a predominance of some particular kind of process. The directly
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evoked orocesses lie, for the greater part, within the area of
maximal clearness, while those indirectly evoked are usually
moderately clear, and less frequentljr obscure.
3. There is usually a gradual decrease in the cle ame s s
^nd frequency of the various processes from phase to phase.
Nevertheless, just as we found in Experiment 2, that
althougn processes varied as to function, we could not say which
component was of the most importance to the perception, so in this
experiment, we eannot say wnether processes with lower frequency
but of greater clearness (directly evoked orocesses) are oi more
importance to the oerceotion, or orocesses with a greater
frequency and lower degree of clearness (indirectly evoked
processes )
.
Table XIII.
1st to 2nd ?hase: 2nd to 3rd Phase
Observers + +
G 50 25 13 29 19 6
De 27 7 4 8 6 1
Ra 29 13 9 8 2 1
Ru 53 6 30 26 16 17
Totals 159 51 56 71 43 25
D. A comparison of the primary and accessory processes
in perception.
Proolem and method . As a result of our experiments with
objects possessing minimal or only slight significance, we
have found that perceptions are composed of typical orocesses
which display particular functions and which vary as to fre-
quency and clearness. The processes nay be divided into those
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controlled or directly evoked, - in our oase the light
sensations, - and those indirectly initiated, the kinaesthet-
ic , organic and imaginal processes. In this nart of the in-
vestigation, we have attempted to determine the relative
value of the controlled and uncontrolled processes to the
perception ox highly significant objects. For this ouroose
69
a series of fifty miniature objects was prepared and
attached to cards, in order that they might be exposed in
69. The series given in the order of presentation included
cloves, pieco of rubber sponge, match and match-box lid,
pickle, bell, burned cigarette, velvet, ginger-snap,
scales, whistle, date, Indian clubs, chain, wet chamois,
cherrv and leaf (artificial), tennis racket, bottle of
green liquid, hammer, loaf sugar, lantern with red
glass, thumb-tack, rubber ball, coffee grains, slice of
lemon, cannon, violets, sand-paper, b-ll-bat, striped
candy, telephone, sweet peas, fur, suit-case, orange
T>eel', firecracker, red rose, ice, dumb-bell, half of
English walnut, peanut, slice of onion, red hot wire
(heated by electric current), key, chocolate candy,
stamp, celery, thorny twig, screw, slice of apple, and
pitcher.
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the tachistosco^e.
The objects were purposely chosen to call forth special imagery
and kinaesthetic processes. We wished to find out whether the
sensations, immediately initiated, imaginal orocesses, or pro-
cesses connected with organic movement bear the chief importance
in the perception* According to our purpose, some of the objects
were chosen for the possible initiation of auditory imagery (as
the bell and whistle), others, for kinaesthesis fas the Indian
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clubs and hammer) ; others again fas the rose and sweet noas)
to call out olfactory images, ihese objects were exposed for
one second, and introspection was demanded for just the exposure
period. The observers were Da, Ra, and Ru. The instructions
were
:
"Two seconds after a "ready" signal, an object will be
briefly exposed. Observe the object carefully. Siva a full
introspective account of the (l) meanings, (2) processes,
sensational and imaginal
,
reporting upon their clearness as
'very clear 1 , 'moderat ely clear', or 'very obscure', and (3)
temporal course of the perception."
Results
.
Table XIV gives the tabulation of the results
of this experiment with resoect to the frequency of the directly
and indirectly initiated processes. P and C represent
respectively peripheral and central processes. + and - indicate
whether or not a process or complex was taken by the observer
to add to the meaning of tne perception.
If conclusions may be drawn upon the basis of frequence,
we find that there is a tendency for indirectly controlled pro-
cesses to increase in number as meaning becomes more elaborate
a result which Experiment 2 also suostantiat ed. In the case of
obj.3Cts of comparatively little meaning f "slight " ) the indirect
perioheral orocesses have a percentage of 49 (17 +32); the
direct, 27; and the indirect, central, 24 (15 + 9) . But a com-
parison with the frequency of the same processes when meaning is
more elaborate indicates in the latter an increase in centrally
initiated processes. Under such conditions, the kinaesthetic
and organic sensations are still the most frequent-, comnosing
approximately half of the total number (47$), but the imaginal
components show a greater frequency (23 + 6%) than the \risual
sensations (24/b). Thus there is an indication of elimination

TABLE. IE.
MEANING..
COHSVDEm&LE
If*D\RECT iHDIfVECT.
P C P C
+ + + + +
Dr 8 9 YL 3 42, 75 32. 43 17
R* Totals 1 Z 9 45 \9 3 46 7
Ru 5 6 15 & 2, 45 107 2,5 39 8
D* z.3 2,5 8 8 36 15 2.\ 8
Ra PEttCfcHTWaES 44 4 a 53 II 55 \6 3© 6
Ru 16 to 50 1 7 2.0 48 W 17
Gkrhd
2.5 16 £9 14 Q 132. 2.01 60 I£8 32.
2,7 17 32, 15 9 2.4 36 U 2.3 6

of processes connected with organic movement and of an increase
of imaginal materials as cognitive elaboration develops.
If the importance of the various processes is estimated
from a consideration of their relation to the development of the
meaning, the indirectly evoked members of the perception again
stand high. In the perceptions possessing slight significance,
the percentage (41) of the indirectly initiated processes which
failed to enlarge the purport exceeds that (32) of the same
processes when they added to the meaning. But when we turn to
the oerceptions with much significance, there is an unexpected
increase in the opposite direction: 59% enhanced significance,
whereas but Itj'o failed to do so. These facts become all the
more signilicant wnen we consider that irrespective of the rela-
tion of the indirectly evoked processes to the development of
meaning, the directly initiated visual complexes represent but
aoproximat ely the same percentage (27 and 24), whether meaning
is slight or complex. This again supports the fact that
accessory processes become of increasing importance to the per-
cent ion.
When the indirect peripheral processes are compared
with the indirect, central, the former seem to show a slightly
higher value than the latter. These results, however, would be
more conclusive if more observers had been employed in order
to minimize or reduce individual variations. When meaning was
Slight , the Percentage was approximately the same for both the
kinaesthetic and organic sensations (17) and the imaginal
materials (15), which augmented the significance of the percep-
tion. The positive peripheral processes, however, exceed the
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imaginal by 13% in perceptions with much meaning. Nevertheless,
there is an individual variation as to the importance of these
two kinds of complexes. Two observers, Da and Ru, always show
a oredominance of indirect peripheral process (25 and 20$, 36
and 4870), which added to meaning, over t he imaginal ( 8 and 7%,
21 and 17,o)
,
but Ra possesses a higher frequency of the positive
centrally excited processes (33 and 38;o) than of peripherally
initiated (4 and 16%). Therefore, as far as our results go,
whether the oeripneral or central processes, indirectly excited,
are of more importance to the meaning of perception depends upon
the individual.
The relative importance of the various processes to the
perception may be considered from another ooint of view, that
of the relative clearness of the different processes. Table
XV represents a tabulation made u:on this basis.
70
An inspection of Table XV suggests that most (22 and
20)1) of the indirect peripheral processes occur at the moderate-
ly clear level, but they also show relatively high frequencies
(compared to those of other processes) in the areas of maximal
clarity and obscurity. The visual sensations Present the high-
est frequency in the. focus, while the imaginal processes are
fairly well distributed throughout all three levels. Again, as
with the results of the Table XIV, these generalizations must be
70. The symbols v, m, i^nd represent the various levels of
clearness: very clear, moderately clear, and very obscure.

TABLE 33L
MEANING
Flight
DlRECT Ir\D\*ECT.
P C P C
Observed V M V M V M V M V V M
Da
TbTftLS.
1 t 9 6 6 3 V 30 38 43 1& \0 19 3\
Rr 6 2, ?! 1 9 3 M 7 4 6 7 9 33 \4 6
Ru 5 1 14 \_6 3 1 43 2. \& 63 57 6 2^9 Ifc
D* £0 36 n M 3 6 6 \a 2.\ \£ 5 9 15
RfV 30 7 7 7 4 33 n 6 3 5 6 6 2.1 \2. 5
17 3 47 2.0 10 3 13 .9 6 2.3 2*5 2. 6
TOTRL.
2,0 3 2.0 \3 10 6 6 J07 t\ 4- 56 113 92» 49 49
VU 3 \3 2.2. \4 n 6 6 19 4 7 to 2*0 \7 3 It 9
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consi&ered in the light of the i'act that there were but three
observers and but one hundred and fifty p erceot ions, and that,
therefore , averages tend to loose their significance under the
influence of individual variations.
Let us consider now some of the variations indicated.
These are most marked in regard to the accessory comolexes.
With respect to the organic and kinaesthetic processes, Da
presents the greatest percentage among the maximally clear for
the slight, but among the moderately clear for high significance;
Ru, in the moderately clear region for both; while for Ra, who
reported very few at all in oerceptions with slight meanings,
the peripheral accessory phenomena tend to dron into obscurity
in percent ions with more cognitive elaboration. With resoect
to imagery, we find the same extensive variations. Ra, whose
central accessory nrocesses indicated a closer relation to the
perception than the peripheral accessories, finds that the for-
mer are usually maximally clear as opposed to the obscurity of
the latter. Prom this, we should expect to find that the cen-
trally excited processes are more frequently found in the obscure
regions of consciousness by Da and Ru. Da, having reported very
few under the first class, shows almost equal distribution there,
but in the second class of oerceptions, or those with ii.uch sig-
nificance, she reoorts more as obscure than in both of the other
levels together. For Ru, the imaginal processes came, for the
greater part, within the region of moderate clearness.
The results of this investigation indicate then: ft) that

although the sensations directly initiated comoosa but
aooroximately 25"% of all nrocesses, nevertheless they are of
fundamental imnortance to nercent i on , since they are generally
the clearest faotors, and always bear some -oositive relation
to the development of the meaning; (2) that the relative values
of the indirectly evoked orocesses depend primarily unon the
observer, both in respect to enhancement of meaning and to the
clearness of tne various processes, - with, however, a oredomin-
anoe in favor of kinaesthet ic und organic orocesses, when indiv-
idual differences are eliminated.
But there is stili another very important question related
to the analysis of oerceotion wnich arises and may be answered
from these results, namely, tho absolute necessity of organic
movement for oerception. Each reoorted the analysis of fifty
oerceotual complexes during this investigation. Out of that num-
ber, Da reoorted 10% and Ra 30^ which involved no kinaesthesis
or organic comolexes of any type, sensational or imaginal. Ru
discovered some kind of bodily movement, general or localized,
in every oerceotion. But the fact that two observers introsnec-
tively found complexes in which no such factors were involved
indicates that the processes are not an absolute necessity
for perceiving an object. This conclusion is further substan-
tiated by the results of Experiment 1, where 8/o of the tyoical
perceptual formations lacked kinaesthetic or organic factors.
This percentage would be materially increased (11$ for
each S and V out of the total number of their integration?
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listed in the IS typical patterns) if individual variations
were considered, rather tnan determining the percentage upon
the basis of all perceptions for all observers. This would
also be more just to actual facts, since we have seen from
Experiment 4 that the incorporation of organic factors within
71
perception is a matter of individual differences.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
From the combined results of all our experiments , we may
conclude that 'visual' perceptions tend, under our conditions,
to present typical formations, which are composed of similar
processes or members and are similarly organized or constituted.
During the four exneriments we have anal7/zed approximately
li300 perceptual complexes, all of which have revealed forms
of integration the same as, or similar to, the standardized
forms symbolic ed in Table III. We find the same component
processes reported from perception to perception, whether the
percept ion carries fragmentary, limited, or elaborate meaning.
On the side of organization, again# our general results indicate
no significant differences in the modes of integration of com-
ponent parts of the complex (irrespective of changes of con-
71. The results of a minor problem (conducted by Miss Davis,
one of our observers) with emphasis upon this particular
phase of perception seem to further support our facts.
Three of four observers have thus far reported 44, 21, and
4c/o of their perceptions without any organic factors.
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dition, whether the observer was instructed to attend to com-
position alone or to composition and constitution;. In the
third place^we have found a gradual change in the function of
the various accessory processes, which is expressed in the
modification and particularly the expansion of meaning. This
modification will be made evident by a review of Experiment
s
1, 2, and 4 f 3 used the devices of l), where there is a gradual
evolution in complexity of the materials used. The functional
modifications seem to follow a definite, temporal sequence; (it
in perceptions with very little meaning, the various accessory
orocesses serve to intemret it, fS) in oerceotions with more
meaning, these orocesses not only interpret but also aid in
localizing the object and a few may even be involved in
appreciation, and (.3) in perceptions with elaborate meanings,
the localizing and especially the appreciative functions become
mors and more frequent. A fourth general conclusion may be
made in regard to the relative value of the 'direct'and
'indirect' orocesses to the moaning of the perception. In all
trie experiments, we find a predominance of kinaesthetic and
organic factors over visual sensations and imaginal processes.
3ut in spite of the predominance of xinaesthesis in the total
number of perceptions, in each investigation there were report-
ed frequent oerceotions which did not Involve any form of
organic movement. General results indicate, then, that, althou^
organic movement is incorporated into most perceptual complexes,
its frequent absence seems to show that ob.jects may be per-
ceived Without any organic movement.
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Our results agree in general with the views maintained
by several writers, James, Bagley, V/allaschek, Lehmann, and
72
Titcnener, that the background, sensational or inaginai, is of
fundamental importance to the meaning of percent ion. The
kinaesthetic and organic sensat ions and tne imaginal proc asses
under our conditions have consistently formed a 1 setting' or
'halo' for the 'visual' focus, and have supplied more of derived
significance than the 'directly' initiated processes themselves.
But we would not go so far as to contend that this 'context 1 is
73
the meaning, since the process itself is always to be consider-
ed as distinct from its function. When meaning is described
no single process or group of processes, focal or marginal, can
be looked upon as the meaning of the whole complex, but we must
consider all oi the integrated members as a unit. 7/hen we
consider that meaning presents stages of elaboration, - the
lowest being trie bare apprehension of object,- tha directly
evoked processes become of more importance to the significance
in the lower stages than the 'fringe' or 'context 1 . This latter
then functionates as a forced searching or seeking for derived,
elaborate moaning, which usually fails. Nevertheless, as mean-
72. James, W. , op . c it
.
, I, 258; Bagley, "'.C, The apperceot ion of
the spoken sentence; a study in the psychology of language,
Ame r . J . of j? sych o 1 .
,
1900, xii, 80; 7/allaschek, R.
,
J syc
P
olo gi e und Pat ho lo g ie d e r 7o r s t e 1 1ung , Leipzig, 1905,
188; Lehmann, A., Orundztige der Psy_c bo physiologi o
,
Leipzig,
1912, 603; and Titchener, E. B. , A textbook of psychology
,
W. Y.
,
1915, 367 fi.
73. Titchener, E. 3., ibid., 367.
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ing becomes more elaborate, the accessory orocesses acquire
increasing importance. We may say with 3agley that the "margin
and iqciis of consciousness play the one into the hand of the
74
other'.' Ife should further agree with James that the "difference
between those Lstates of mine] tnat are mere 'acquaintance'"
four p exceptions' with minimal meaning), and "those that are
' knowledges-about "' four perceptions of maximal meaning) '!i.s re-
ducible almost entirely to the aosence or presence of psychic
75fringes or overtones."
Since we have contended for such an intimate relation
between meaning and process, we cannot agree with the exoonents
of ' imageless 1 thought, that the two are separate Processes.
Mooredwho has attempted to prove the presupposition experiment-
ally, by a comparison of reaction times, seems to have fallen
into two gross erroAs, first, he has failed to take into account
stages of elaboration of meaning, and secondly, he has assumed
that, if imagery and meaning were synonymous, the imagery
must refer to the stimulus itself. Only very elaborate, derived
meanings are considered in his results, and as the introspections
of our trained observers show that perceptions under such con-
ditions are very complex, we feel justified in asserting that
Moore left out of account the greater share of essential
orocesses, which are introspect ively observable. In regard
74. Op. cit .. 129
.
75. James, W. , oo. cit.
,
I, 259.
76. Lloore', T. V. , 'Jhe temporal relations of meaning and imagery,
°sychol. Rev
.
,
1915, xxii , 177.
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to imagery, our own results show that the .emory image of the
stimulus, whether visual or kinaesthetic was much less
freouent than images with derived meanings, all of which bore
a direct relation to tin total meaning. A comparison, then, of
the reaction times of meaning and of imagery, directly referring
to stimulus, would not be a fair determination of the relation
of the meaning to imagery, since the greater share of imaginal
Drocesses have been disregarded. A qualified statement of this
77
oroblem by Tolman accords better with our own results, namely,
that "meaning depends u.)on image but is itself distinct from
the latter."
Our experimental results seem to justify the following
generalizat ions
:
1. 1 Visual 1 pe rceot ions present a number of tyoical for-
mations, each of which presents its own peculiar mode of inte-
gration and is marked by a distinctive temooral course. These
r
formations are vaiouslv based unon three kinds of mental
A y
processes, fl) visual sensations directly evoked by stimulus,
(2) kinaesthetic and organic sensations indirectly evoked
(oeri"oheral accessories), and (3) imaginal materials drawn from
various sources (central accessories)..
2. All 'visual' percent ions have the same general consti-
tution. The visual sensations, directly evoked by stimulus,
are usually the clearest orocesses within the oercer)tual pattern,
77. Tolman, 3. C, Mora concerning the temporal relations of
meaning and imagery, Psycaol . He v .
,
1917, X3£iv, 138.
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v/hile the accessory orocesses lie almost entirely in the
region of moderate clearness. The obscure orocesses are, for
the greater part, not relevant to the percent ion. During the
temporal course of the perception, typical modifications occur;
fl) there is a gradual decrease in the number and clearness of
the processes from phase to ihase, and (2) there is readjustment
of the various factors themselves, the visual sensations tend
toward obscurity, while the accessory processes become more
p rominent
.
3. The component processes fulfill different functions
according to the degree of cognitive elaboration, '.'here the
meaning is minimal or slight (as in the bare apprehension of an
irregular figure), the processes first bear the meaning and
secondarily reinforce (in the form of effort or intent) a self-
instruction to seek significance in the figure. Where the mean-
ing is moderate or complex, beside the primary ascription of
meaning, the accessory orocesses may either give a value to the
object perceived (appreciative function) or set it in its spatial
and temporal relations (localizing function).
4. Meaning is directly correlated with the number and
degrees of clearness of the indirectly initiated process (per-
p teral and central accessories).
5. Organic movement is not an absolute necessity for
perception.
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